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CHAPTER I 
IN'lRODUCTION 
A pre-view of Kentuckyls.history previous 
to the Civil War, explaining conditions, forces, 
and events, which gave her a position of ~por­
tance during that period. 
• 
The state of Kentucky, the oldest Commonwealth west 
of the Allegheny Mountains has had bequeathed to her an 
heritage of geographic determinants, historical movements 
and sociological trends Which may claim a title of dis-
tinction in the history of the Nation. A deeper knowl-
edge of this inheritance and a broader acquaintance of 
those simultaneous and consecutive forces which made for 
this importance, are the essential elements that form a 
background to this study. Kentuckyls ideals, traditions, 
achievements or the past and their causes constitute the 
raw material from which the attempt has been made to con-
struct one more little block in the monument of her fame. 
Kentuckyls history is unique in the varied stages of 
its development, but a title to distinction or position 
of importance in the history of our nation was won during 
the formative period of her existence, a time when men 
and measures were alike on a continuous tria~ building 
the structure of this Commonwealth with famous deeds.'which 
Shed a lustre of renown on her descendants of 1860. The 
first century of Kentucky's history staged the civic up-
heavals through which she had the satisfaction of winning 
.;, 
the acknowledgment of the nation that her Commonwealth was 
important, in fact, One of the foremost of the union of 
states. 
• 
The variety of forces that Shape the destinies of a 
people and make them what they are, is not perfectly re-
vealed when the normal functions of civic life are operat-
ing in a normal manner. It is when the body-politic be-
comes ill-conditioned by serious maladies that the true na-
ture of that people is recognized. Wars are diseases, in-
ternal disturbances, like critical illnesses of individu-
als, and granted they are unnatural accidents of develop-
ment, yet they mark the stages of their developmental his-
1 
tory in a distinctive manner. The period of supreme test 
in the history of Kentucky comprised her allegiance first 
to the Mother Country, Virginia, later to the National Gov-
ernment in the first years of her statehood and then to the 
1. N. S. Shaler, Kentucky, A Pioneer Commonwealth, 
Houghton MifflIn Company; (New York, 1884), 1'72 
Union, the United States of America in the conflict ~f 
1860. 
The first Kentuckians were frontiersmen of the most 
dauntless type, "with coon-skin cap and long rifle, re-
.... 
claiming the wilderness from the savage and subduing the 
2 
forces of nature." Kentucky, called "rrhe Dark and Bloody 
Ground," or "The Middle Ground," as John Filson following 
• 
the practice of the Indians themselves, named it, was the 
disputed territory of savage tribes before the invading 
pioneer came. The Indians, alarmed for the safety of the 
cherished hunting ground, formed a strong coalition to 
protect themselves and banish the invader; a little more 
than a half century later, this same unenviable position 
of "Middle Ground" was the theater of combat. This en-
counter was no less bloody and no less savage than that 
contended by the aborigines. The Unionists and Secession-
ist sympathizers coalesced in order to preserve the "Dark 
and Bloody Ground" from a fratricidal strife. 
Daniel Boone, the greatest specimen of pioneer life 
3 
that our western annals recall, and followers stamped 
2. E. M. Coulter, Civil War And Readjustment In Kentucky, 
University of North CarolIna Press, 
(Chapel Hill, N. C. 1926), 1 
3. R. M. McElroy, Kentucky In The Nation's History, 
Moffat, Yard and Company;-{New York, 1909), 33 
the colony with habits of independent thinking and s~lf­
dependency that were never entirely obliterated. Kentuc-
ky's "distinctiveness" dates from this period. Fearless, 
intrepid, fore-sighted, individualistic, self-dependent 
" ... , 
are the traits that have been commonly accepted as Kentuc-
ky's "distinctiveness." Of no other people perhaps, can 
it be more truly stated that 
Rivers, mountains, and plains, fertile 
soil and poor, racial strains and early 
experiences - all tend to set a people 
apart and stamp them with an individu-
ality. 4 
The Kentucky settlements were separated from the fron-
tier of civilization in Virginia by a wide zone of wilder-
ness; Louisville at the Falls of the Ohio is the only city 
on a large river. The early settlers avoided the larger 
streams, uchoosing the smaller affluents and rich undulat-
5 
ing country between." The home-making motive is seen her~ 
and is a favorable contrast to the gold-greed and trade-
craze of their neighbors, - the French and Spanish settle-
ments and their more distant neighbors, the northern settle-
4. Coulter, 1 
5. E. C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Con-
ditions, Houghton Mifflin Company, tNew York, 1903~2 
ments. The early Kentuckian, however, was not only ~ home-
builder but was also a state-builder. From the exigencies 
o£ this isolation, the colony became rapidly dif£erenti-
ated £rom the parent-state, Virginia, and after the many 
.. , 
bloodless battles fought with self-reliance and alone, a 
long-desired statehood was won. 
A good parallel has been drawn.between this separa-
tist struggle of 1784 - 1790, and that of the secession 
movement in 1860 - 1861. There is a remarkable likeness, 
since in both cases, Shaler asserts, the majority of the 
le!ders were £or extreme measures and thought the masses 
were for them; the latter in both cases would not be hur-
ried in their political decisions. Discernment and sagac-
ity have ever characterized the body-politic, and £rom 
what may be called a rather singular political conserva-
tism, Kentuckians were twice saved £rom danger. In the 
£irst decision more credity was deserved than in the second; 
in the £irst, the separation was £rom a government that 
"hardly existed, and against which many valid objections 
6 
could be brought," with no violation o£ pledges. 
6. Shaler, 107 
The New England States bitterly opposed the adm!ssion 
of Kentucky to the Union, and from that time until the Re-
construction Period the offense was not forgotten among 
the extremists of Kentucky. Massachusetts, especially, was 
~ disliked, because of the answer made the young Commonwealth 
at her invitation to concur with the Resolutions of 1798, 
and also for the anti-slavery propa~anda originating in 
7 
that section. 
The first twenty years of the history of the state of 
Kentucky brought about a considerable increase of the Eng-
liSh population in the interior of the continent. If Ken-
tucky had waited for Virginia or. the Federal Government to 
take care of the Indian situation, there is little doubt 
but the growth in population would have been retarded. Keep-
ing in mind the hardy, strong-mindedness that made for so-
lidity of character, it is not difficult to explain the 
staters success in surmounting the legislative obstacles 
put in her path by Virginia. Shaler asserts that 
••• This spontaneous, unaided movement 
7. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were made by the state 
legislature as a result of the Alien and Sedition laws, 
recent enactments of Congress. Kentucky held that such 
acts were a violation of the Constitution, and called on 
the states for cooperation in preventing their executio~ 
of people into Kentucky, and their swift .' 
organization of a State under such appall-
ing difficulties, must always remain as 
one of the most surprising achievements of 
the English race. 8 
It has b~en truly said that Kentucky was born into 
~ 
the American Revolution and cradled or nurtured in the In-
dian Wars; her experiences could not be more pathetically 
expressed than in these words: 
If any community of people have lived, 
since the dispersion of the plains of 
Shinar, to this day, who were literally 
cradled in war, it is to be found in 
the state of Kentucky. ~e Indians' 
path of incursion in the West was mois-
tened with Kentucky blood - our battle-
fields are white with Kentucky bones. 9 
In the light of suCh evidence, is it not incredible 
that the "Savior of the West" for over half a century was 
little noticed by most writers of Revolutionary history? 
Historians claim that George Rogers Clark saved the settle-
ments in Kentucky; his exploit also gave us probable title 
to the Northwest Territory. To win the enemy's territory, 
8. Shaler, 120 
9. w. E. Connelly, and E. M. Coulter, History of Kentucky, 
I, American Historical Society, (New York, Tg22), 296 
his objective included Ohio# Illinois# Indiana, and.is-
consin. Great Britain was not able to finance this expen-
sive western war, and one of the dominant reasons for an 
American Independence was an economic one. For the win-
.c, 
ning of the West, a large share of the laurels should be 
given to a small band of dauntless pioneers# unknown and 
disregarded by the patriots east of. the Alleghenies. '!he 
importance of our first "Great West" was such that many 
have maintained it was "the main object of eight years of 
diplomacy, and of the most bitter and dangerous political 
10 
controversy in American history." 
Because of the prominent part played by Kentucky in 
the War of 1812# she was styled, "Savior of the West." A 
beginning of greater national recognition is noted from 
this time. In return there was also noted greater inter-
est in the nation by the state. Having successfully met 
all her difficulties from without, more serious problems 
from wi thin faced the young Commonwealth. From sad exper-
ience she learned the importance of the monetary system. 
With the understanding of the principles of exchange at-
10. S. M. Wilson, History of Kentucky, I, The S. J. Clarke 
Publishing Company, (Cnrcago, 1928), 3 
tained at this time l the state was placed on a sound·'fi-
nancial basis and remained so in all future crises l as a 
view of the greatest of crises l the Civ1l War will show. 
Beginning with 1815 the trade spirit arose and the 
.. , 
war spirit waned; the forces that had been requisitioned 
for war and politics now turned toward commerce; Kentucky 
became the main depot or supply sta;ion for all the west 
and northwest country. Her industrial organizations were 
11 
in the lead of the neighboring states. The moulder of 
Kentucky's public opinion even at this time was that im-
mortal genius l Henry Clay. He is considered the founder 
of the conservative element of Kentuckyl - "the party that 
takes the tasks of government deliberately and philosophi-
callYI that debates l before acting~ and after actingl the 
questions of public duty as they should be considered I -
12 
has never lost its hold upon the State." 
The political questions continually brought before 
the Northern and Southern States and as old as the Cons-
titutionl itself were slavery and States' Rights. Fanat-
ics of both North and South refusing to consider compro-
11. Shaler l 174 
12. Ibid. 1 187 
mises of any kind~ so completely were the opinions of an 
opposite section to each other~ that the cries for peace 
from the people en masse were not heeded by the powerful 
political parties in power. Kentucky's stand regarding 
.... , 
these two political questions had much to do with her as 
an important factor in the Civil War. When Clay began to 
be a power in the nation~ then Kentucky also, became in-
• • 
volved in national affairs. The perplexing difficulties 
that were menacing the nation challenged her individual-
ity~ her strong-mindedness~ her distinction of being dif-
ferent. Sectionalism had not made its paths in the "Mid-
dle Ground." Kentucky was apparently sha~ly divided in-
to Mountain and Bluegrass sections~ but the geographical 
difference did not become a basis for political cleavage 
1; 
before the Civil War. Kentucky's sectionalism was not 
of that hue which had menaced the "solid North" and the 
"solid south." In Kentucky the party factions were as a 
rule~ based on personalities or on state issues. 
public opinion was in favor of slavery, but it was 
not in favor of slave trade~ either foreign or domestic. 
13. Wilson~ II~ 184 
Laws were passed in 1833 binding immigrants with an ~iath 
that they would not sell their slaves. The slave-trader 
was looked upon with contempt and aversion by each class 14 
of Kentuckians. There were three important reasons for 
... , 
Kentucky's strong defense for slavery in face of her in-
sistence with the North on the continual preservation of 
the Union; first, the antecedents of this people, second, 
• 
the actual conditions of slavery itself, and third, also 
chiefly, a deep conviction that a state should be allowed 
to exercise each power delegated in the Federal Constitu-
15 
tion, unmolested by outsiders. 
The opinion of Shaler regarding slavery in Kentucky 
is given from long personal knowledge of the inhabitants 
of the Commonwealth and from fair opportunities for in-
sight into their motives. He, himself, was a son of an 
owner of slaves and yet he writes: 
I am inclined to think that a majority 
of those who owned slaves in Kentucky 
were opposed to the institution, and 
would have been ready, if the way could 
have been found, to make a considerable 
sacrifice to break it up. 16 
14. Ibid., 212 
15. Coulter, 7 
16. N. S. Shaler, "Border State Men of the Civil War," 
Atlantic Monthly, LXIx (Feb.;-r8~);--252 
Virginia's principle of primogeniture never gai!'1ed a 
place in Kentucky; and thus the land became more evenly 
distributed requiring less slave labor. For the slavery 
of Kentucky was not an economic question but a political 
.... 
one. The mountain people had little use for slaves and a 
less use for negroes; they felt the poor negro's existence 
was that of a farm horse l but he was well cared for by 
• 
every one l the poor white l that of the livery stable horse 
who was worked by everybody and cared for by none. 
Slavesl as a rule l did not suffer in Kentucky; slav-
ery was of the domestic sortl and as a proof of this it 
was a fact that they could have escaped very easily over 
the border at any time l yet it seems that comparatively 
few took the opportunity. Owing to conditions prevalent 
in Kentuckyl the slave appears to have had a much better 
part; this fact is asserted that 
••• there were two sets of slaves ••• 
the servants and the masters; it is 
hard to say which was the more heav-
ily chained ••• We might also justify 
the paradox that the masters were the 
real subjugated clas!. 17 
17. Ibid. I 249 
The interest o£ the landholding £armer element~e­
specting slavery was not so exaggerated as to blind them 
to the evils o£ the institution~ nor did they anticipate 
withdrawing £rom the Union Should their interests be in-
.47 
terfered with. It was the abolitionist from the outside 
who de£eated the very cause £or which they were working. 
Clay's doctrine was the gradual el~ination o£ the slave 
element by emancipation on the soil~ or by colonization. 
Radical measures against his tenets by abolitionists who 
were trying nto do right in the wrong way" ~ no doubt~ di-
minished the number of Kentuckians who desired to see a 
legal solution of the appalling difficulty. 
A trenchant editor of Kentucky~ the pivotal border-
state~ makes clear the point of view of men so situated: 
We seriously believe that when the North 
and South meet each other £ace to face 
and eye to eye; when they take the ideas 
of each other's sentiments and opinions 
from unprejudiced sources~ and not by the 
perverted mediums o£ stump speeches~ par-
tisan diatribes~ buncombe resolutions ••• 
they will be prepared to fraternize most 
cordially~ and kick parties, politicians, 
platforms~ and sChemers into the pit of 
Tophet. 18 
18. Louisville Journal~ Aug. 14, 1860 
This paper edited by George D. Prentice was pre-emi-
nent in Kentucky and had a fame and reputation that 
was national. Its circulation was the largest of any 
paper in the entire middle section of the Union. It 
is said its influence equaled tt4o~000 men in the Un-
ion army at thi s time. n 
r 
Thus we see the border states in general had a more ~van-
tageous opportunity to acquaint themselves regarding the 
distinctions the various leaders of opinion held in respect 
to slavery. 
~ The decade immediately preceding the Civil War was a 
time of continual excitement. Political parties gradually 
and distinctly divided along pro-sl~very and anti-slavery 
lines. In 18511 the first political campaign for the abo-
lition party in Kentucky polled three per cent of the votes 
of the states. Cassius M. Clay was their nominee for Gov-
19 
ernor l and did much to take away the odium of the party. 
In 18601 slavery in Kentucky was on the wane and it 
was considered a source of serious evils to the state; it 
proved a deterrent to immigration and a stimulus to emi-
gration of the yeoman class. The war ended the wrangling 
over the question that had agitated the state and caused 
endless trouble. In the election of 1860 1 Kentucky polled 
20 
145,000 votes; of these Lincoln received only 1 1 366. 
If the issue had been simply one of slavery or anti-slav-
19. Shaler, 217 
20. R. H. Collins l History of Kentuckyl II 
Collins and CompanYI (Covingtonl Ky. 1882)1 84 
ery, of Breckinridge and Lincoln, there is no doubt ~hat 
Breckinridge, a native Kentuckian and allied by marriage 
with a powerful Bluegrass family, would have received the 
other 144,000 votes. However, the issue was not clear-cut, 
~ 
there was a question of Unionism and Secession involved 
which reduced the Breckinridge vote. The old-time Whigs 
as pro-slavery as the Democrats but. traditionally national-
istic, would not join their old rivals not even under an 
abolition club; they sought new alignment in the garb of 
the Constitutional Union party. 
It has been declared by many that the Kentuckians of 
1860 and 1861 were the most peaceable and most Constitu-
tion-abiding Americans. Many reasons have been advanced 
for their attainment of this distinction, this undisputed 
position of importance. Some concede that it was the re-
su1t of long training in the science of government, as 
Kentucky was singularly rich in men of decided political 
capacity; unlike the more Southern states whose leader-
ship was placed in the hands of a few dominant families, 
21 
Kentucky's influence diffused the dicta of leadership. 
21. Shaler, 381 
The fact that Kentucky, alone, escaped the ill fortune 
of her sister btates who were preCipitated into the hasty 
rebellion may be due to a spirit of conservatism. This was 
acquired from sad experience in the episode of the old and 
.. , 
new courts and the resultant financial crisis. The men who 
led her from these mirages of a corrupt political world had 
the reputation of being strongly co~servative; Clay was the 
chief among them. 
The geographic location, it is said, gave Kentuckians 
a better understanding of the governmental problems harass-
ing the country, than those not placed in the current of 
opinions of all sections. ~e border-line position also 
placed her in danger. The economic factor, the more prac-
tical minded asserted, was her chief motive of unprecedent-
ed conservatism; not the currents of opinions so much as 
the currents of trade were the determinants, - the main 
causes making the decision for Kentucky, a Mississippi Val-
ley trade-state. Loyalty to the IIUnion under the Consti-
tution,tI is the big incentive most Kentuckians are wont to 
claim for the unique stand of neutrality assumed and un-
successfully maintained. Though the expedient was futile, 
it was not thus considered at that time, but on the other 
hand, it was looked upon as a spontaneous compromise on 
the part of a people who had serious reasons to keep war 
from their door. Kentuckians were not chronic belli~er­
ents in 1861, no, nor at any other time of their history. 
Secession on the part of the South and coercion, on 
the part of the North were both unjustifiable, Kentuckians 
~ 
thought. The existing conditions did not warrant the ex-
isting measures used to cure them. It was a most sincere 
loyalty that prompted the innumerable expedients or com-
promises. Greater crises had been faced and met to the 
satisfaction of the majority, why not this one said they 
and the sister border-states. In speaking of this almost 
fanatical love of the Union, McElroy quotes from General 
Hodge, sometime officer in the Confederate Army, as saying: 
Their loyalty was nearly akin to the 
religious faith which is born in 
childhood, which never falters during 
the excitement of the longest life, 
and which at last enables the cradle 
to triumph over the grave ••• The Un-
ion was apotheosized. 22 
Had Kentucky been consulted there would have been no 
secession and no coercion. But for the sense of devotion 
to the Federal Government, - the Union, and for the State 
22. McElroy, 507 
constitution and government, the excitement of the times 
and the intense pro-slavery sympatilies surrounding her on 
all sides, there is no doubt like her "erring brethrenlt , 
Kentucky would have been caught up in the maelstrom of se-
.... 
cession. The Unionists of Kentucky repeatedly based their 
opposition to secession upon the saying which became pro-
verbial in 1860 and 1861" that "secession is a remedy for 
• 2; 
no evil" but an aggravation of all."' It appears that 
the principle of States Rights facilitated the activities 
of the secession element in the Kentucky Commonwealth" and 
disposed that party to be carried away at least partially 
from its allegiance to the Union during the slavery agita-
tion; it was not the main cause but the contributing one. 
Sectional agitation and sectional bitterness fomented by 
a sectional party may be accountable for the "irrepress-
ible conflict." 
The basic reason for Kentucky's neutrality" then" was 
a desire for a peaceful perpetuation of the Union. When 
that goal could not be attained" then her loyalty to the 
Commonwealth was apparent. Throughout the history of each 
2;. Captain Thomas Speed" The Union Cause in Kentucky, 
G. P. putnam's Sons, (New York, 190fn,~ 
American Commonwealth, there is seen a diversity of ~oyal­
ty. In some the nationalistic tendency is prevalent be-
cause their geographic positions have given them slight 
local history. In others loyalty to the Commonwealth is 
stronger because the population is~homogeneous and circum-
stances have effected a large sphere of action. Of the 
latter type, was Kentucky. When the Federal Union would 
• 
not listen to peace measures, then the next step was to 
save their own state from impending ruin. Neutrality was 
the result. 
In the greatest political upheaval in the history of 
the country, Kentucky, the belligerent, Kentucky, the in-
dependent, Kentucky, the different sister, was the only 
state who resolved to debate the principle of states Rights 
and keep her action wi thin the lind ts of her constitutional 
provisions. Deliberate thought, sense of duty to the state 
24 
laws resulted in keeping the State in the Union. 
Thus in the forces, movements, conditions, and events 
may be seen the evolving situations that determined and 
culminated in the status quo of Kentucky in 1860 and 1861. 
24. Shaler, 391 
CHAPTER II .' 
A GEOGRAPHICAL APPRAISAL OF KENTUCKY 
~ Kentucky's geographic location, and the variety of 
geographic conditions, namely, the climate, soil, and nat-
ural resources are the determinants,- the differentiating 
~ 
factors in her Civil War history. Her relative importance 
in that war has its final basis in geographical conditions. 
The dominant, fundamental factors were: 
The Physical Outline 
The Mountain System 
The River Systems 
An Extensive Borderline From East 
to West 
The Gaps 
The Mississippi and Ohio 
The area of Kentucky is greatly extended on an east 
and west line, measuring about five hundred miles in le~.· 
It occupies a central position in the union of States and 
owing to the difference in the altitude, slope, soils, min-
erals, and general surface variations, it may be divided 
into several natural geographical divisions. 
The rugged Appalachian Mountains on the east, under-
lain with rich coal fields; the level tableland with rich 
bluegrass soil; the picturesque Knobs and the western part 
with the rich alluvial plains produce a beautiful and va-
ried geographical aspect. 
.' 
From the apex ot: the Cumberland Mountains on the east 
and south-east begins the source ot: the tributary rivers 
ot: the state Which t:low into the Ohio River, the northern 
boundary and then into the Mississfppi River on the south-
west. The extent ot: Kentucky'S river front is well de-
scribed by Nathaniel Shaler, Kentuc~'s eminent geologist 
.. 
and historian: 
The Big Sandy, the Licking# the Ken-
tucky, the Salt, the Green, the Trade-
water, the Cumberland, and the Tenn-
essee give a greater t:rontage on whol-
ly or partly navigable rivers than is 
t:ound in any other State ot: the Union. 
The total length ot: streams that have 
been more or less used t:or navigation 
exceeds two thousand t:ive hundred miles. 
'lhese streams are rarely interrupted by 
t:alls or impassable rapids. 1 
Thus Kentucky, a single mountain valley, lies between 
the two westernmost ridges ot: the Allegheny System, which 
are broken by two gaps, one Cumberland Gap, on the east of 
the range and Pine Gap on the we s t ot: it. The S ta te of 
Tennessee forms at least four-fifths of the southern bor-
1. Shaler, 25 
der-line, with Virginia on the south-east and Missou~i on 
the south-west. Kentucky was a border state with all that 
a border position implies; during the great conflict she 
tended to become a part of both north and south because of 
~ 
the place bequeathed her by geography. One Kentuckian de-
scribed this central position thus: 
Right here, in the very ce~ter of the Mis-
sissippi Valley, lying like a crouching 
lion, stretched east and west, is Kentucky, 
the thoroughfare of the continent. 2 
The geographic segment cut deeply and surely into the 
southern border-line. Kentucky was a part of the south 
geographically; she was forced to look southward through 
the course of the Mississippi River. The first route to 
Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap served Virginia and the 
other Southern states. By 1860 Kentucky was not only basi-· 
cally Southern in population but pointed to her Virginia 
origin with pride. Alliances were also contracted through 
marriage and friendship, thus effecting a predominant ra-
3 
cial coalition. The importance of Kentucky's southern 
2. Cincinnati Commercial, Dec. I, 1870 
3. Connelly and Coulter, II, 792 
border-line is apparent, first of all in population.·' Ken-
tucky has been styled a "deluxe editiontf of Virginia. She 
was an offspring of Virginia, hence her partialities, her 
kinship, her sympathies, her institution, her traditions 
were pro-southern. 
.. , 
Though many agencies were operating to-
ward the alienation of these strong blood ties, the Census 
of 1860 shows that the majority of ~entuckians born outside 
the state were from her Southern Border-line; Virginia had 
contributed 45,000, Tennessee ,4,000, North Carolina l,,60~ 
4 
and Maryland 4,415. Kentucky, Southern in origin could 
not but look on her mother-country and the remainder of the 
South with the loyalty of kinship and traditions. Family 
sympathies and sentiments of the Civil War period tended to 
follow a geographical division. According to Garrett Davis: 
The sympathy for the South and the in-
clination to secession among our people 
is much stronger in the south-western 
corner of the state than it is in any 
other part, and as you proceed towards 
the upper section of the Ohio River and 
our Virginia line it gradually becomes 
weaker, until it is almost wholly lost 
• • •• 5 
4. u. s. Bureau of the Census. Eighth Census, Population 
and Agriculture, Government printing off'ice, (washing-
ton, 1866), 185 
5. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 
War of' the RebellIOn;-Ser. I, vol. 2, (Washington,1900), 
678 (Referred to hereafter as Official Records,) 
Of the most pronounced geological formation in Ken-
tucky Shaler says: 
The Confederacy received the youth and 
strength from the richest part of the 
Kentucky soil. The so-ca1led Blue Grass 
soil sent the greater part of its men of 
the richer families into the Confederate 
army while the Union troops, though from 
all parts of the State, came in greatest 
abundance from those who dWelt on thin-
ner soils. 6 
Captain Thomas Speed takes issue with this pronouncement 
of Shaler's and states that: 
Such an idea is emphatically wrong ••• 
The division of sentiment was no more 
marked in the Blue Grass than anywhere 
else ••• Notwithstanding the historian 
Shaler's remark •••• the truth •••• is 
well expressed in what Colonel Ed. Porter 
Thompson says about the First Kentucky 
Brigade (Confederate), that they repre-
sented Kentucky as a whole ••• 7 
Considering that Speed was not a geographer or historian, 
but a true and loyal Unionist, it is well to have recourse 
to statistics. The line along Which Union and Southern 
sympathies divided geographically can be easily seen. 
6. Shaler, ;74. 
7. Speed, 158, 179. 
r 
statistics also corroborate such sympathies, for example, 
twenty of the wealthiest counties of the Blue Grass Section 
gave ;0,000 men to the South, and only 6,000 to the North. 
Forty other counties gave 4;,000 men to the South, and only 
18#000 to the North. ~ Fayette County, the heart of the Blue 
Grass gave 1,558 men to the South, and only ;80 to the NFth. 
pulaski County, a decided Mountain County gave only ;60 men 
• 8 to the South, and 1,800 to the North. On January 5, 186;, 
in his speech in the United States Senate, Garrett Davis 
seems to verify the above statistics: 
I live in what is called the Blue Grass 
County, and a more wealthy agricultural 
country does not exist anywhere. I re-
gret to say that the heaviest defection 
to the Union cause is in the plains, the 
Blue Grass region; and the greatest de-
votion and fidelity to it is in our moun-
tains and hills. 9 
Garrett Davis, like Speed, was a Unionist, yet he bears 
out the historian's statement as well as the statistics, al-
though there may have been numerous as well as conspicuous 
exceptions. The following is an indication of the trend of 
8. Annual Report of the Adjutant-General, January I, 1864, 
Kentucky Documents;-Yeoman Orrice,(FTankfort,l866),l5,16 
9. Congressional Globe, ;7 cong., ; sess., Part I, Con-
gressional Globe Office, (Washington, 186;), 187 
the Blue Grass region: 
We are sorry to say that the men of this 
riCh and beautiful region of Kentucky 
have not rallied as they should to the 
defense of the Commonwealth. 10 
The mountain men early inihe war looked 
upon the Blue Grass region as interested 
only in making money out of the conflict 
and furnishing the officers. 11 
• 
.' 
The level lands and more fertile soils as in the Blue 
Grass section produced decided Southern sympathies, while 
the thinner soil area and the mountain section were pro-
ductive of Unionistic tendencies. Shaler saysl however, 
that this geological distribution of politics was by no 
means peculiar to Kentucky; it was common throughout the 
12 
South. "It should not be inferred,tt says Coulter l "that 
the Blue Grass was a hot-bed of secession. It was not; 
but it had no heart for the war against the South and 
1; 
showed it abundantly." 
The influence of the geographic determinant, the 
mountains l has been noted particularly in the pronounced 
sympa thies for or against the Union. It has been seen 
10. Louisville Journal, Oct. 26, 1861. 
11. Cincinnati Commercial, Oct. 221 1861. 
12. Shaler, 2;2 
1;. Coulter l 12; 
r 
f 
I 
I 
and noted particularly many times that 
The whole region of the Southern Appa-
lachians had therefore no sympathy with 
the industrial system of the South; it 
shared, moreover, in contrast to the ar-
istocratic social organiz~~ion of the 
planter community, the democratic spir-
it characteristic of all mountain peo-
ple, and likewise their conservatism, 
which holds to the established order. 14 
• 
.' 
T.he mountains declared for the Union; this type of section-
alism was general over the state and most pronounced in 
certain sections. Todd County is said to have furnished 
more troops to the Federal army in proportion to its popu-
15 
lation than any county in the Union. The population of 
the mountain district of Kentucky had been drawn to a very 
great extent from the non-slaveholding yeomen of the Blue 
16 
Ridge frontier who had moved west by the Wilderness Road. 
A geographical and topographical survey of the state 
as has been observed by Coulter would afford an index into 
17 
sympathies of the state as a whole, and we may infer that 
the geographical location was the all important factor in 
determining the destiny of the state in 1861, just as the 
14. Semple, 285 
15. W. H. Perrin, Counties of Todd and Christian, Kentucky, 
Battey Publishing Company,-ranicago, 1884), 80, 108 
16. Semple, 284 
17. Coulter, 122 
r 
I 
: 
geographical line of cleavage told the natural antag~ism 
between the lowlands and uplands, the plains and the moun-
tains~ Kentucky throughout its length from east to west 
was of paramount importance to the South, and because its 
.... 
ties of blood and of institutions bound this Commonwealth 
18 
with the Southern States, the Confederate Government felt 
this strategic geographical area would be added to the South • 
• 
If there was any section to which Kentucky was bound 
in close sympathy it was that of the Mississippi Valley. A 
manifest destiny of the states of the Mississippi Valley 
was that they should remain one and inseparable; this great 
river system was Ita bond of union made by nature itself and 
the Kentuckian thought the Union should be maintained for-
19 
ever. It 
Kentucky's northern borderline given to her by geog-
raphy connected her strongly with the North. Hence her 
pivotal position in the Civil War can be easily seen. She 
was a pivotal border state with all that word implied. She 
was not upon the western flank like Missouri, nor was she 
enveloped by free territory like Maryland, with no natural 
18. Shaler, 235 
19. Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861, 
Longman's, Greenand Company, (New YOrk-,-1921), 108 
boundary. She was central~ and bounded bn the North 4 by 
the Ohio River for about seven hundred miles; the three 
States of Ohio~ Indiana, and Illinois were bounded south 
by the Ohio River and by the single State, Kentucky. ~is 
.... 
explains the great extension east to west very graphically. 
The following statement ~rom Collins gives a vivid 
picture o~ this geographic situatio~: 
The Ohio River, was at best but a great in-
ternal canal, dividing Kentucky ~rom Ohio, 
Indiana and Illinois. Thousands of people 
~ound in the states of Ohio and Indiana 
those occupations which provided daily sus-
tenance, but returned at nightfall to sleep 
in Kentucky. 20 
The geographic principle that rivers present the lines of 
least resistance to the incoming colonist, and afterwards 
lend themselves to his economic needs is no better exem-
plified than in Kentucky's northern borderline, the Ohio 
River. Due to its proximity perhaps, many of Kentucky's 
people have emigrated to Missouri on the extreme south-
west and to the three Northern States mentioned. 
As we have seen~ the Southern borderline was impor-
20. R. H. Collins, History of Kentucky, Published ay The 
Author, Richard li. CollIns~ (LOuisville, 1877), 896 
.... 
r 
tant because of the distribution of Virginia's population 
through the State# and by the general immigration of other 
Southern States# so we can readily understand the pulling 
of Kentucky's heart-strings toward the North by reason of 
~ her population attacbments as indicated by the exodus of 
native Kentuckians northward. 
The first movement of the Kentucky migration was di-
• 
rected to the North of the Ohio River into Indiana and 11-
linois. Vfllen these states were admitted into the Union 
and for a considerable time afterwards Kentuckians formed 
the bulk of their population. The first migration to Ind-
iana and Illinois reached its peak about 1835. The move-
ment into Missouri was of a little later development and 
had not reached its highest peak even ih 1850. The census 
statistics are our best source of information. The first 
census in whiCh nativity statistics are available is that 
of 1850. There were in Missouri# 69#694 Native Kentuck-
ians# in Indiana 68#651# in Illinois 49#588 and in Ohio 
21 
Such a report shows that the exodus had been di-
rectly pointed to the States of Indiana# Illinois and Mls-
21. U. S. Bureau of the Census. Seventh Census# Compendium, 
Government Printing Office# (Waslilngton# 1862)# 2 
r 
souri. In 1860 according to statistical tables l Ken~ck­
ians living in these states were Missouri 10010001 Indi-
22 
Figures 
speak more strongly than words that Missouri is appropri-
~ 
ately called the daughter of Kentucky. The limitations of 
such statistics are that we have no certainty that the na-
tive-born Kentuckians living in any~tate went to that 
state directly from Kentucky. They may be Kentuckians 
once or twice removed or even several times removed. 
23 
Lincoln1s family was an example of twice-removed;.first 
to Indiana then to Illinois. It has been said of Lincoln 
that "though born a Kentuckian l he did not possess Ken-
tucky eyes." 
Not only were Northern population ties strengthened 
by emigration but also by immigration. In 1860 Kentucky 
numbered among her people those who had come directly from 
the Northern border. Ohio 1410001 Indiana 710001 and 11-24 
linois 31000. 
Kentucky1s northern boundary-line l a river-line pre-
sented no lines of resistance but welded the people to-
22. U. S. Bureau of the Census l Eighth Census l population 
And Agriculture l (Washington l 1866), 185 
23. Wilson l III III 
24. u. s. Bureau of the Census l ibid., 185 
gether. Thus there is given another evidence that 
Geography knows no rigid lines of demar-
cation, no sharp transitions. The geo-
graphical unity of a river valley tends 
to be reflected in the homogeneity of its 
population, a homogeneity ~ot only of con-
stituent race elements but also of insti-
tutions and ideals. 25 
.' 
The importance of this unity and ho~geneity of Kentucky 
population of 1860 was that they were factors that weighed 
heavily in determining the state's decision in the impend-
ing crisis, the Civil War. Most forcibly was the strength 
of blood-ties expressed by Garrett Davis, a Kentucky Sena-
tor: 
Why, Mr. President, Kentucky has almost 
peopled the northwestern states especial-
ly Indiana and Illinois. I have no doubt 
that one-fourth of the people of Indiana 
are either native-born Kentuckians or the 
sons and daughters of native-born Kentuck-
ians. They are bone of our bone and flesh 
of our flesh ••• When you offer to the Un-
ion men of Kentucky their choice whether 
they will remain united forever with Indi-
ana, and Ohio and Illinois, or go with 
Georgia or South Carolina and Florida, 
they will answer fA thousand fold will we 
25. Semple, 284 
be uni ted ra ther with the Nor thwe s t than • 
with those distant States.' 26 
The foreign population in Kentucky in 1860 was of re-
t accession and was due to the opening of factories on oen 
.', ~e Ohio border and to new settlements of German farmers 
1n counties rorm.ing the northern border or the State. The 
. DUDlber of foreign birth was 59,799 •• Although Louisville 
:bad the major1ty, there were five counties having more 
27 
tball a thousand each. The yeoman element and the indus-
trial and foreign residents on the northern border tended 
to balance tne strong planter element in the Blue Grass, 
28 
aristocracy of the state. 
It has been claimed that when the great issue faced 
Kentuckians, they like all the other states followed no 
atngle geographical line, and that nothing showed the line 
of demarcation of sentiment better than the division of 
Op1nion of members of the same family. Examples are given 
most prominent families of the State, i.e., the 
the Cr:1ttendens and the Breckenrid.ges. Of Henry 
Co~essional Globe, 37 cong., 2 sess., Part 1(1861-
I862J, 425 rrarrett Davis, "Speech in the U.S.Senate." 
• U. S. Bureau of the Census, 'Eighth Census, Population, (Washington, 1860), 183-185 . 
• Semple, 285 
r 
Clay's grandchildren, rour were Conrederate and threQ 
Union soldiers; Thomas L. Crittenden's autograph is ap-
pended U.S.A. and his brother's C.S.A. 
or the hour which had come "when brother ahall rise 
against brother," Collins claims th8t topograph1cal pos1~ 
tion or peculiarity or property did not seem to inrluence 
the division. Planters turned their backs upon their plan-
• tations to join the ranks or the Federal army, while from 
the Northern Border, men who had never owned a slave rode 
29 
away into the Southern Lines. 
We read that lifelong rriends parted, to go their 
separate ways, not with the taunt that stings but with the 
clasp or the hand that means a rriendship, which even the 
most extreme dirferences of political raith cannot destroy. 
30 
'lbe choice was made by each man, himself. 
To all such claims we can only say that such divi-
sions were not the general rule as has been shown by sta-
tistics. Population ties drew the state in both direc-
tions, but numbers seem to indicate the exactness of the 
geographic principle of political cleavage; Unionist and 
29. Lewis Collins, Outline History of Kentucky, I, 
(Covington, 1882), 342. --
30 • Shaler, 253 
r 
secession sympathies divided along geographical line~~ 
Kentucky was the most centrally located of the border 
states. Throughout her extensive length she presented a 
strategic area of paramount importance to the South and to 
~ 
the North. Only a native of the state and a scholarly one 
could so graphically describe that importance as: 
• Wedged in between the Confederacy and 
the Union, Kentucky stretched its great 
length east and west from the Appalachi-
ans to the Mississippi across the very 
threshold of the South. Traversing its 
territory, the Mississippi, Tennessee, 
and Cumberland Rivers opened up parallel 
avenues for an invading army into the 
heart of the Confederacy, while Cumber-
land Gap and the great intermontane val-
ley of east Tennessee afforded a protec-
tive highway from the borders of the Blue 
Grass country to northern Georgia. 31 
The one defenseless line was the Ohio River along the en-
tire northern border of the state. vVhat wonder then that 
disregarding all legislative mandates, both belligerents 
invaded the boundaries of the state and thus brought an 
end to its neutrality. The territory became Union but 
"the flower of its manhood marched across the border into 
31. Semple, 288 
r 
;2 
Tennessee to join the standard or the South. • 
Thus Kentucky's strategic geographic position, her 
land boundaries, her water boundaries, her mountain bound-
aries.were surriciently important to draw the attention or 
both Lincoln and Davis at the very autset or the war. 
The history or every war is proroundly inrluenced by 
the nature or the country where it is rought. Thus in the 
• Civil War, with the opening or hostilities, geographical 
conditions directed campaigns and inrluenced the results 
or battles. "In no other war or history," says Semple, 
"have rivers played so prominent a part as in the Civil 
War. 'lhis importance is rerlected in the names or the Fed-
eral armies, - "Army or the Potomac," "Army or the Tennes-
see," "Army or the Cumberland," etc. 1he great size or 
the territory rorming the western theater of the war and 
the long lines or communications maintained by the invad-
ing Federals l made the western rivers more erfective chan-
nels of communication than railroads which could be easily 
torn up by one of the brilliant raids of the Conrederate 
Cavalry. The river routes required no watching, and the 
;2. Ibid., 288 
immense superiority of the North in steamboat buildiBg 
gave it valuable equipment. 
;; 
One can readily see of how great importance to the 
Southern cause was the river system's part when we consid-
~ 
er that the Mississippi, from the southern boundary of Il-
linois led through the Confederacy to the Gulf; the Ten-
nessee, a little to the east opened a highway to northern 
• 
Alabama, and the Cumberland into Tennessee. The obvious 
advance of the Federals was the parallel course of these 
three rivers, while the Ohio commanding the entrance to 
these three routes, was the natural objective of the Con-
federates. 
It is also readily seen of how great importance was 
Kentucky's part with her two thousand five hundred miles 
of streams rarely interrupted by falls or rapids. 
Several historians have made mention of this particu-
lar importance of Kentucky and Shaler claims it was abso-
lutely necessary to the prosecution of a;[ successful cam-
paign in the valley of the Mississippi. That this im-
portance was well understood by the Confederate authori-
;;. Semple, ;00, ;01 
34. Shaler, 275 
r 
ties is seen in their Plan of Campaign; By way of Kentucky 
secure the Ohio River Line, thus transfer the war to the 
frontier of the South, then extend the invasion to the 
Northern soil. 
'4", 
The North also saw how important Kentucky was to the 
accomplishment of its campaign plan. Shaler, the geolo-
gist, observes that President Linco1p had an excellent nat-
ural capacity for military affairs, when he perceived the 
supreme importance of that point of the Appalachian Moun-
tains which lies about Cumberland Gap. By way of this re-
gion, the Confederate armies could easily force themselves 
on to Central Kentucky. There are several other roads, 
all passing near Cumberland Gap by which troops could make 
35 
their way from Central and Eastern Tennessee. Hence is 
seen the reason for the Union Plan of Campaign: Blockade 
the Southern ports; obtain control of the Mississippi and 
capture RicPmond. 
The geographical position of Kentucky was prominent 
in making possible two of these plans and her mountains 
played an important part. For mountains by nature lend 
35. Shaler, 286 
themselve~ to strategy. Within their rugged ramparts. the 
movements of armies are concea1ed# hence protected from un-
expected ~ttaclCs. The gaps open the way for swoops upon 
the enemy in the plain# and a rapid retreat is easily at-
tained. Cumberland Gap and the pas! formed by the Tennes-
see River were the two openings in the escarpment wall of 
the Cumbe~land Plateau which gave access to the valley of 
.. 
East Tenn~ssee, hence were strategic points in the western 
operat1on~. ;6 
The ~ppa1achian ranges stretching through the Confed-
eracy to ~orthern Alab~a divided the campaign 1nto East-
ern and Western enterprises. Both were of decisive impor-
tance. F~r the East, victory promised the capture of the 
Confedera~e Capitol; for the West the Confederacy would be 
severed ~dthe Mississippi Valley would be opened to the 
Gulf. In the trans-Allegheny country# mountain passes and 
rivers de~ermined the military lines, though in general un-
connected with the Atlantic p1ain# were of the nature of a 
vast fla~ movement upon the Confederates. 
;7 
Gene~a1 Leonidas Polk entered Kentucky and secured the 
;6. Se1llp1a, 297 
;7. John ~iske The MiSSissippi Valley In The Civil War# 
HOUghton MlfrIIn Company# (New York;-l~)# 38 ----
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Mississippi by occupying the bluffs at Columbus near.'the 
Tennessee Line; he saw the importance of the town of Cairo, 
at the junction of the Ohio River with the Mississippi. 
"These bluffs," Fiske relates, "afford foothold for an 
army approaching from the rear, bu€" on the other hand they 
are unassailable by fleets on the river. A shipts guns 
cannot be elevated suffiCiently to inflict fatal damage on 
.. 
such a place, which on its part can return such a plunder-
ing fire, as is difficult for the strongest ship to endure. 
It was therefore by fortifying Columbus (Kentucky), the 
first of a line of bluffs. that the Confederateacould hope 
38 
to retain their hold on the Mississippi River. 
At the same time General Zollicoffer invaded the 
south-eastern corner of the State, establishing his lines 
near Cumberland Gap; through this Shenandoah Valley of the 
West, the Confederates could throw their invading armies 
over the Cumberland Mountains into Central Kentucky by 
minor passes, eluding the Federal forces at Cumberland 
Gap, threaten Frankfort and even CinCinnati, then retreat, 
driving their captured horses and long wagon trains of 
38. Fiske, 182 
r 
plunder from the rich Blue Grass country, and vanish..along 
the old Wilderness Road into the mountains again. 39 
Immediately following this simultaneous invasion of 
Kentucky's neutral soil by the Confederates, Grant's army 
.. ; 
moved across the Ohio and took up its position at Paducah 
which commanded the mouths of the Tennessee and the Cumber-
land. 
The very element in her border situation that had 
caused Kentucky to adopt a policy o~ delay had now to be 
met, i.~. the danger of invasion from the North and South. 
'!his na tural ~ear was expressed thus by Archibald Dixon: 
We have a million white population resi-
dent in a state only separated by the 
Ohio River from Indiana, Illinois, and 
Ohio, with a population of five million. 
Through each state are numerous railroads, 
able to transport an army of one hundred 
thousand men upon every part of us. 40 
Indications of hostility on the north bank of the 
Ohio showed that the Kentuckians' fears were well-grounded. 
During these precarious days, the neighbors across the 
river presented many difficulties for the Kentuckians and 
39. Semple, 303 
40. Rebellion Records, I, 75 
they in turn caused their northern friends much alarn!'. The 
elders had suffered innumerable hardships to give homes 
and happiness in abundance to those very children and gran~ 
children whose efforts were now being made to subjugate 
... .., 
their relations. Thus the Civil strife rent firesides that 
had known only peace and comfort. 
Some measure of redress was ma~e to Kentucky by a proc-
lamation of Albert Sydney Johnson in which he gave explana-
tion of the position of the Confederacy. The invasion of 
Kentucky had been in self-defense and that it was not his 
intention to dictate to Kentucky if they still wanted strict 
neutrality. However, if they intended to join the Federals 
and declare war they' should not censure him for meeting 
41 
"that war whenever and wherever it may be waged." 
The fall of Forts Henry and Donelson soon followed the 
loss of Cairo; the defeat of the Confederates at Mill Sprir.g 
on the upper Cumberland in the southeast of the state had 
for its prize the strategic point of Cumberland Gap. It 
compelled the evacuation of Nashville by the Confederates, 
41. Official Records, sere I., Vol. 4, 420, 421 
.' the abandonment of the Cumberland line and the falling 
back to their second line much farther South along the 
bend of the Tennessee. In fine, the theater of the war 
was changed from the North to the South. 
The panic along the banks of the Ohio, upon General 
Bragg's campaign and his approach in the summer of 1862, 
may serve to remind us how unpleasa.t it would have been 
for the North had the area and the forces of Kentucky been 
added to the Confederacy. "The failure of Bragg'S cam-
paign," says Shaler, removed the seat of all grand move-
~ 
ments of the war from Kentucky •••• but Kentucky's soil 
was often invaded by the daShing cavalry raids and destruc-
tive guerilla encounters. 
Kentucky's importance was not in the number of battles 
fought, or the nature of those battles, but in her strate- • 
gic geographical position as seen in the short sketch of 
the campaigns of both belligerents. "Kentucky," as Coul-
ter has so pertinently said, "although a border or fringe 
that might be thought of as joined to either section, •••• 
" 4; 
was the heart of the Union.... She was neither wholly 
42. Shaler, ;;1 
4;. Coulter, 1; 
Northern nor wholly Southernl but a border-state Commbn-
wealthl forming within herself a great zone of conflict-
ing elements and tending to become a part of the North and 
!l4 
a part of the South. 
.  ..., 
The importance of Kentucky in the Civil War was the 
result of many factors. Due to her geographical position, 
there were many forces l many movements pulling her first 
• 
one way and then another l so that it cannot be said that 
anyone factor was a deciding issue resulting in her im-
portance. Each exerted its own influence and the final 
outcome was distinctive. In attaining this distinctionl 
however, we are reminded of the truism that civilization 
is at bottom an economic fact, at the top an ethical fact, 
but in the final conclusion, the basic facts are physical; 
for any country the physical are the geographic factors. 
44. Ibid., 42 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC FACTORS PECULIAR TO KENTUCKY 
In the consideration of the physical factors that 
contributed to Kentuckyts ~portance in the Civil War, it 
was seen by tlle ~litary campaigns ~~t both Davis and Lin-
coIn were untiring in their efforts to secure the control 
of their natal state. Was it the bulk of land, they saw 
extending from Virginia to the Mississippi, or the periph-
ery of the state, fifteen hundred miles in length? Was it 
her river-system alone that attracted their attention or 
her mountain passes alone? Undoubtedly, both were desir-
able. But they also saw Kentuckyts forty thousand square 
miles lying across the path of trade from north to south. 
Commerce was the magnet drawing with irresistible force 
the attention of the North and the solicitude of the South. 
It has been said that the most delicate barometer for 
detecting and measuring conditions, is commerce with its 
1 
financial background; particularly was this true of Ken-
1. Coulter, 239 
r 
tucky in the period of her history immediately preceding 
and during the Civil War. Owing to her geographic posi-
tion, Kentucky was in the current of trade movements, and 
some historians assert that her position of neutrality was 
mainly an economic one. Usually poXitical affiliations 
follow material interests, and economic resources derived 
from trade appear to have brought much pressure on the quefr 
2 • tion. 
The Mississippi and its tributaries had always been 
the dominant trade arteries of the state, and though canals 
and railroads had diminiShed this status to some extent, 
yet the whole situation demanded subtlety and consummate 
diplomacy on the part of both belligerents in formulating 
general trade regulations. 
In view of the fact that Kentucky's long geographic 
line stretched across the path of trade from north to sou~ 
commercial conflicts could be expected. Another factor 
that conditioned the trade relations in no small degree was 
the equally divided sympathies of the population. That 
both Kentuckyfs sons understood thoroughly their mother-
2. Connelley and Coulter, II, 868 
r 
state's composite problem was evidenced from the ver~' 
first days of the crisis, and it was at this t~e from 
January to August 1861, that Davis and Lincoln adopted 
general trade policies for the border states Which affect-
.... " 
ed Kentucky, the chief of them, because of her geographic 
position. The Confederate policy may be summarized in 
statements of the laws passed: 
February 2~, 1861 - Free navigation of the Miss-
issippi to all vessels of any state bordering 
upon its navigable tributaries. 3 
May 21, 1861 - No cotton or cotton yarns should 
be Shipped from the Confederacy to the North. 4 
August 2, 1861 - Embargo extended to include 
tobacco, sugar, rice, molasses, syrup and naval 
stores. 5 
The ulterior motives of the South were obvious; un-
doubtedly historians say, t1a bid for the border states. It 
This was concluded from the feveriSh activities following, 
i.e. the provision for custom officers, the formulation of 
rules for their appointment, plans for ports of entry and 
3. Official Records, Series IV, Vol. I, 3 
4. Ibid., 341, 342 
5. Ibid., 529 
r 
custom houses in operation at an early date. President 
Davis' message to Congress was also of undoubted signifi-
cance. He stipulated that 
Free transi t has been secured f'or ves-
"7 
sels and merchandise ~assing through 
the Confederate states, and delay and 
inconvenience have been avoided as f'ar 
as possible, in organizing the revenue 
service f'or the various railways enter-
ing into our territory. 6 • 
It is impossible to state the amount of provisions 
that reached the Confederacy through Kentucky. She was 
truly then as noW' the "Gateway of' the South." All the 
western states, through Kentucky neutrality, assisted the 
7 
rebels by furnishing provisions. We are not surprised 
at such reports that Tennessee alone had secured wheat and 
f'lour enough to feed the state troops for a year, or that 
1,200,000 pairs of' shoes had gone South, or that the meat 
products represented by ;,000,000 hogs had been Shipped to 
the rebels bef'ore Kentucky had abandoned the position of' 
8 
neutrality. 
The South was being amply stocked and !'rom the re-
6. J. D. Richardson, A Compilation of' the Messages and 
Papers of' the Confederacy, unltea-S~es pUbliShing 
Company;-{NiShvl11e, 1905}, I, 77 
7. The Crisis, November 7, 1861 
8. E. A. pollard, The Lost Cause, Treat and Company, 
(New York, l86~ 
r 
cords available# it is plainly seen that Louisville ~s 
the filling station. A graphic description of the great-
est single economic movement and of the collecting and dis-
tributing center# Loulsville# in the spring and summer of 
~ 
1861, as a result of the free trade in the Mississippi Val-
ley is given by an eye-witness: 
Day and night for weeks palt, every 
avenue of approach to the depot has 
been blockaded with vehicles waiting 
to discharge their loads# while al-
most fabulous prices have been paid 
for hauling# and the road has taxed 
itself to its utmost capacity to 
carry through the enormous quanti-
ties of freight delivered to it. 9 
Louisville's prepossession for Southern trade cannot 
be more accurately attested than from the freight accounts 
of the Louisville and NaShville Railroad. The amount of 
freight forwarded to the South was $252,000# and the amount 
received from the South was $51#000. 
for the year ending JUne, 1861. 10 
These figures are 
Not only did Louisville Show her important economic 
connection with the South by her land artery of trade, but 
9. Cincinnati Gazette# June 15# 1861 
10. Annual Report of the President and Directors of the 
Louisville and-Wasnville Rallroaa-Company, Hanna---
and Company# (Louisville# 1861)# 21 
r 
i her waterways also, were such that could not be just}~ con-
demned for economic inadequacy. The business of forward-
ing the river commerce absorbed much capital and energy of 
the larger Ohio River cities. This was particularly true 
of Louisville. ~ Situated at the natural obstruction made 
by the falls to continuous navigation, she became the nat-
ural port of the upper Ohio, and the head of navigation for 
11 • the lower streams. 
At the beginning of the Civil War, when inland navi-
gation was extended owing to the canals and improved facil-
ities of the steamboat, the export trade of the Mississip-
pi Valley was no longer a river traffic to New Orleans, 
but a steam-boat intra-valley trade, which rapidly devel-
oped and filled in all gaps in river traffic made by the 
changing route of that trade. The commercial prosperity 
of Louisville, Cincinnati, Memphis, and New Orleans, Saint 
Louis and Nashville owed much to its intra-valley trade. 
Regular daily lines of steamboats left Cincinnati for Mad-
ison, Louisville, Nashville, Arkansas and New Orleans, and 
also there was a daily average of a half-dozen steamers 
11. Semple, 262 
arriving at Cincinnati, thus showing an equal divisie'n of 
up and down river tra~fic. The south-bound boats carried 
corn, candles, whisky, apples, bacon, hay, poultry, ~lo~ 
horses and mules. The up-river tra~~ic was just as im-
.. ., 
portant. It included molasses, sugar, raiSins, ~niture, 
lemons, oranges, turpentine and cotton. The whole aspect 
of this trade was one o~ mutual dep,ndence of the two sec-
tions; the existence of the commerce was much more impor-
tant to the economic solidarity and the contentment of the 
12 
Valley than the use o~ any particular route. Thus by 
reason o~ her land and water routes, Kentucky was a veri-
table highway between the Confederacy and the Union. Her 
trade had drawn her commercially to the North and the 
Louisville and NaShville railroad which had just been com-
pleted led her to the heart of the Confederacy. 
This enviable economic position was not to be of long 
standing. Louisville merchants became alarmed about the 
seizures of Shipments of munitions destined for Tennessee 
1; 
and Arkansas. Kentucky took issue with Cincinnati ~or 
interfering with commerce on the Ohio, for she based her 
12. E. M. Coulter, "E~fects of Secession Upon the Commerce 
of the Mississippi Val1e~ MIsslssIpPIJ[i~rIcal 
revieW; no. 3, (December 1916), 2'/5 
1;. Cincinnati Commercial, April 15, 1861 
r 
cla~ to the Ohio on the Virginia act of cession of the 
Northwest Territory to the Federal Government. A friendly 
understanding was concluded by the Kentucky delegation and 
Governor Dennison's amicable letter, they were told, was 14 
the expression of the people of OhlO. Cincinnatians, 
however, did not agree with their Governor; only a few days 
later, in a meeting of strong Unionists it was resolved 
• 
That any man or set of men in Cincinnati 
or elsewhere Who knowingly sell or ship 
one ounce of flour, or pound of provisions, 
or any arms or articles which are contra-
band of war, to any person or any state, 
which was not declared its firm determi-
nation to sustain the Government in the 
present crisis, is a traitor and deserves 
the doom of a traitor. 15 
Home Guards were organized in Cincinnati and their 
chief duty was to suppress all contraband trade with the 
Sou th. '!hey were diligent in wa tclling s teamboa ts, search-
ing depots, and ordering suspicious bales and boxes back 
to warehouses. The Governor, too, abandoned his concili-
atory attitude toward Kentucky by forbidding telegraph 
operators to transmit orders for munitions of war by any 
14. Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War, Moore Wilstock and 
Baldwin Company;-r-(rrrnclnna~, 1868), 39, 40 
15. Ibid., 40 
person except the Governors of States loyal to the Union, 
or Officers of the United States Army or Government, or 
Mayors of cities in the loyal States. A week later orders 
were issued to all railroad presidents in Ohio l to examine 
all frei~ht going toward Virginia or any other seceded 
states. Soon the Legislature set up a system of espion-
age to examine all freight leaving the state. All orders 
• 
referred primarily to arms and munitions of war, and in 
every instance it was found possible or was made possible 
to interpret them in such a way as to exclude Kentucky 
from participation in the trade. 
Indiana caught the disease in a more malignant form. 
The virulence of the germ may be accounted for in such 
statements as the following: 
• •• we would urge upon the citizens of 
New Albany and Jeffersonville, that not 
one dime's worth of any supplies - not 
even a pound of butter or a dozen of eggs -
be allowed to cross the river from this 
side, till this species of 'neutral' ras-
cality is at an end. 17 
The Governor of Indiana informed Lincoln that in his es-
1h. Reid, I, 41, 42 
17. Cincinnati Daily Gazette l Editorial, June 15, 1861 
r 
timation all commercial intercourse with Kentucky should 
be stopped# that Kentucky. would not abandon her position 
of heutrality, which was all their so-called Union could 
18 
hope for. Official and individual committees were formed 
and blockades and trade rules issue~. This storm o£ trade 
agitation between the northern and southern banks of the 
Ohio raged on. Illinois, which possessed the strategic 
• 
point, Cairo# at the junction o£ the Mississippi and Ohio 
Riv~s, was the real arbiter o£ the interior river routes. 
At the beginning of the war, Governor Yates had the Illi-
nois troops stationed there and Cairo completely cut off 
trade of the Ohio River cities with the South. Then it 
was that the Louisville and Nashville railroad superseded 
the Mississippi as the highway of the Confederacy; Louis-
ville was therefore# the outlet of the Ohio Valley to the 
South. All efforts to prevent the mad scramble to get the 
19 
trade o£ this section were ine££ective. 
Owing to fraudulent permits allowed steamboats, all 
kinds of subterfuges were resorted to, lience by June 1;, 
1861# there was a general tightening up. The Surveyor of 
18. O££icial Records# Series III, Vol. I, 158 
19. Ibid., Vol. XXXI# Part I, 781 
r 
the Customs announced that arter June 24, no goods of' any 
sort would be permitted to leave Louisville without a per-
20 
mit rrom his orrice. Kentucky's intra-valley trade had 
assumed such proportions and there were such a series or 
.. ., 
trade conrlicts that one trade report records 
The Ohio River divides corn, North 
20 cents a bushel; corn, S~uth side 
40 to 50 cents. The Kentucky rarmers 
will get rich; the Ohio rarmers poor 
under this state or things, ir they 
last long. 21 
What about the Federal Government in respect to the trade 
wrangle~ Did it consider Kentucky's economic opportunity 
a "nerarious business" as did the neighbor-editor who said 
The Neutrality or Kentucky seems to con-
sist in perrect rreedom to :rurnish our 
enemies the Wherewith to make war upon 
us, and the Government knowingly permits 
this nerarlous business. 22 
Did Lincoln have any policy respecting Kentucky? From all 
evidence it appears to have been the same as that respect-
ing Fort Sumter, i.e., provoking inactivity until the im-
20. Collins, I, 92 
21. The Crisis, June 20, 1861 
22. Cincinnati Gazette, June 15, 1861 
petuous South would blunder; in this case he waited until 
Kentucky was sufficiently alienated from the South because 
of embargoes on trade and other differences. When he had 
obtained his objective, then all exits to the South were 
sealed. It is thus seen that Linco!n considered the polit-
ical situation in Kentucky more important than the econom-
ic one. How very important the economic one was is seen 
• 
by Collins statement of the capital, circulation and loan 
records as follows: 
Capital Circulation 
Jan. 1, 1861 ••• $13,429,725 ••••••.•• $10,267,202 
Loans 
Bank of Kentucky ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Northern Bank of Kentucky •••••••••••• 
Farmer'S Bank of Kentucky •••••••••••• 
Bank of Louisville Kentucky •••••••••• 
Commercial Bank of Kentucky •••••••••• 
Bank of AShland Kentucky ••••••••••••• 
Balance previous loan •••••••••••••••• 
$500,000 
350,000 
250,000 
200,000 
100,000 
35,000 
57,559 
~e South by its commercial policy had looked for quick 
results and secured them when Southern products were cut 
23. Collins, I, 98 
off from the North; the North worked for ultimate ende 
and won the larger stake for which she played so craftily. 
Besides the deep political significance, of what value was 
this trade between the two sections? No better evidence 
of its importance is presented than'Xentucky's coffers 
which were bulging with Southern gold as we have- seen by 
the great strength of the banks. That gold was used ulti-
• 
mately for the Union Cause. The financial management of 
the state was of a superior nature. At no time during the 
war had its bonds defaulted in interest or24rinciPal. The 
banks were even declaring small dividends, and when the 
Federal Banks and many of the eastern banks were suspend-
25 
ing specie payments, Kentucky banks refused to do so. 
The State was not sorely pressed for money at any time dur-
ing the war; the banks took the loans which were issued by 
the Commonwealth at their face value, with the confidence 
that the state would not be imperilled by the existing gen-
26 
eral chaos. The state tax rate during the war was forty 
cents per hundred dollars of assessed value. For military 
27 
purposes it spent more than $3,500,000. Kentucky's place 
24. Collins, I, 98 
25. Ibid., 93 
26. Shaler, 389 
27. Hunt's Merchant Magazine, LIV, 346, 347 
~ 
t 
in the ~inancial world o~ 1860 wa s very near ~ir s t lill, • 
The Eighth Census Report, 1860, shows her relative lm1v~-
i tance ~inancially. 
Eighth Census, 18.60 
'07 
- 17.1 ~ ~: 0 orl C'Il ~.g r-I .j.l 4.l QS ~ QS oM STATES ~ .j.l 11.1 r-I C'Il CHQS orl ~ () :::s 0 OH PI QS Q) () PI • .0 QS 0 PI H Q) ~ol:l 0 H Cf.l orl A 0 
Illinois 74 • 5,251,225 $ 387,229 $ 223,812 • 8,981,723 $011,037 
Indiana 97 4,343,210 7,675,861 1,583,140 5,390,246 1,1tO,479 
Kentucky 45 12,835,670 25,284,869 4,502,250 13,520,207 i,~~, 892 
Maryland 31 12,568,962 20,898,762 2,779,418 4,106,869 1,111,180 
Missouri 38 9,082,951 15,461,192 4,160,912 7,884,885 1,111,176 
l-Tew Hamp- 52 5,016,000 8,591,688 255,278 3,271,183 1,111,991 shire 
New Jer-
sey 49 7,884,412 14,909,174 940,700 4,811,832 i,1il,465 
Ohio 52 6,890,839 11,100,362 1,828,640 7,983,889 1,~li,614 
Tennessee 34 8,067,037 11,751,019 2,267,710 5,538,378 1,IU,799 
28 
28. U. S. Bureau o~ the Census, Eighth Census 1860, 
population and Agriculture, (WaShington, IBbbT. 
Figures speak more convincingly than words, and~artic­
ularly so, when they are symbols of monetary values. Of 
these states, Kentucky held first place financially. Ken-
tucky with less than half as many banks as Indiana had al-
~ 
most three times as much capital. Ohio had a few more 
banks than Kentucky and about half the capital. 
Kentucky's primal wealth was i~her soil; 10,000 square 
miles of as fertile land as could be found in the United 
states, the celebrated Blue Grass Region, is claimed by the 
State geologist, Shaler, to be equal in fertility to the 
best EngliSh, Belgian, or Lombardian lands, and that it is 
doubtful that it could be equalled by any other state of 
29 
the Mississippi Valley. The soils were too diverse for 
the cultivation of a single staple crop, and owing to the 
variety of agricultural wealth in 1860, Kentucky held a 
dominating position in the Southern States. The following 
table gives an idea of the diversity of products and the 
relative production as compared with other states. Kentuc-
ky, relying mainly on the soil for her support was better 
able to withstand the Shock of war than those states depend-
29. Shaler, ,0 
r , ing principally on manufacturing industries. 
1850 1860 
'07 
Wheat Ninth Ninth 
Maize First Second 
Rye Fifth 
Tobacco Second Second 
Flax First • Third Hemp First First 
Swine Second Fourth 
Mules Second Second 
Horses Sixth Sixth 
Value of home 
(or household 
manufactures) Second 
30 
Large armies were provisioned from Kentucky's stores; 
Richmond and Lexington were Federal army bases at which tm-
mense stores were held. They were captured by Bragg, who 
is recorded as having carried off one million dollars worth 
of stores and arms, ninety thousands dollars worth of pork 
and twenty thousand men supplied with arms. Two and one 
half days were required for his wagon trains to pass a 
given pOint. It was said that Lexington afforded the rebels 
30. u. s. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, Population 
and Agriculture, ( Washington, 1866), 51 
31 
the richest harvest they had reaped during the w~r. 4.the 
armies on her soil had to be fed and clothed and the sur-
plus produce, live stock and manufactures were requisition-
ed for both contending armies. 
'47 
At the beginning of the war, Kentucky was occupied by 
the Confederate forces in four places at one time and even 
after Federal troops had left the st~te, Grant's armies in 
Arkansas, Tennessee and Mississippi were furnished with 
200 head of cattle daily, and a contract for 100,000 hogs 
32 
was filled. Pork packing was stimulated by the army de-
mands and although the great "Hog Swindle" almost d1lJrupted 
the gigantic business, contracts were soon filled; at the 
Louisville market, a thousand hogs were slaughtered daily. 33 
Demands for horses and mules were constantly made by pur-
chasing agents sent out by the Federal Government; one con-
tract alone was for 2,000 mules. The Louisville Journal 
stated that 
Hundreds of drovers are daily driving 
off our horses and cattle and hogs and 
almost interminable trains of wagons 
31 • Cincinnati CommerCial, Nov. 7, 1862 
32. Collins, I, 145 
33. Cincinnati CommerCial, Dec. 5, 1861 
are hauling away our bacon and pork 
and all kinds of breadstuff ••• 34 .' 
complaints were made about the voracious appetites of the 
armies and fear was expressed that the 
Genius of starvation that has been 
stalking grimly among rebel armies 
and rebel citizens, may haunt our 
own homes. 35 
The report of the 3,000 hogsheads of tobacco sent to Nash-
ville shows that if the soldier must have his pork, he must 
also have his amoke. Tobacco was the most valuable crop; 
in 1864 the prices were $1.50 to $2.00 a pound. The acre-
age in corn was greater than for tobacco, and the whisky 
business prospered when it was not deprived of grain be-
cause of the large government contracts; duri3~ three months 
four counties exported over 213,000 gallons. The same • 
year wine in one count7 alone was made, to the amount of 
31,000 gallons. 
Many attempts were made to make money by persons mas-
querading under the authority of the government at the ex-
34. Louisville Journal, Oct. 4, 1862 
35. Ibid., Oct. 4, 1862 
36. Collins, I, 129 
r 
pense of the farmers. The corn trade was interfered 4ith; 
the distillers of the Blue Grass counties in 1864 were or-
dered to discontinue the distillation of corn; in 1863, all 
corn supplies were turned over to the use of the army. At 
this, however, the general feeling ias that "the army must 
be fed, even if the home drinkers are put on Short allow-
ances in their drinks. tf 37 
• 
Kentucky was to feel the disorganization and economic 
destruction of war; in supplying the armies of the West and 
the army of occupation, She suffered the loss of much prop-
erty. The state was raided for food and horses. It became 
a common practice of marauders to take any horses they were 
able to find and so general was the oppression occasioned 
• 
that "Loaded country wagons," it is said, "with produce for 
market are left in the road; milk carts, drays, and butch-
38 ..... 
ers r wagons are left in the streets, their horses seized. If 
The decrease in livestock was greater in Kentucky than in 
39 
any other state; there was a drop from 388,000 in 1861 to 
299,000 in 1865, in horses and mares; from 95,000 to 58,000 
40 
mules; from 692,000 to 520,000 cattle. Secretary Stanton 
Tri-Weekly Commonwealth, Nov. 6, 1863 
Official Record~, sere I, vol. 45, part 2, 139 
Cincinnati Gazette, January 4, 1865 
American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important 
Events, D. Appleton and Co.,-rNew York, 18(4), 459 
had ordered General Thomas to seize horses and other~pe-
~ 
cies of property needed for military service, so it is an 
expected record we read in the account of tolls paid by a 
border-state. The seizures by both armies and by raiders 
~ 
and guerillas were greater than the other states because 
of the five major raids of John Morgan. This arch-raider 
has few parallels in history. 
• 
When Buckner occupied Louisville in the very beginning 
of the war, on his way southward, he burned bridges, seized 
locomotives and cars, estimated by the railway company at 
~ 
about a quarter of a million dollars. In the campaign a-
gainst river locks, the Kentucky and Green Rivers suffered 
most. Legitimate destructions were increased by lawless 
devastations of guerilla bands. Kentucky became again the 
happy hunting-ground of savage cut-throats and plunderers; 
4, • 
many towns were fired on and courthouses were burned. 
Complaints were continually made against the Federal 
Government for failure in paying the claims of the citizens 
of the state against it. The Governor in his message to 
the Legislature gave an account of the failures to make 
41. Official Records, sere I, vol. 45, part 2, 18 
~. Annual Report of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 
1860-1861, 75,~9---
4,. Collins, I, 108 
r 
I collections on the vouchers left by the army. 
44 Ohio 4flnd 
Indiana were paid for the damage done by Morgan's raids, 
and had not a vigorous protest been made by the Common-
wealth, its claims would not have been recognized. There 
.. ..., 
was set up in Washington a claim-agency for the sole pur-
pose of requiring the Federal Government to pay its debts. 
At the end of the War, the amount due Kentucky was the e-
45 • normous sum of $1,500,000. Shaler states that the Fed-
eral Government slowly repaid the three millions which had 
46 
been advanced by the state for war pUrposes. Kentucky 
was as loyal as any state in the Union, but owing to her 
position geographically, she was considered even by the 
Federal Government Officials as a part of the Confederacy. 
This impression was chiefly due to reports made to Wash-
ington by General Sherman. He claimed that the young men 
of Kentucky had generally joined the Confederacy and that 
the Union men were conservative and would not fight their 
Southern kindred. Sherman saw in almost every Kentuckian, 
a spy for the Confederates. In his disappointment at the 
slowness of the organization of troops, he said, 
44. Louisville Journal, Dec. 19, 1862 
45. American Annual Cyclopaedia, ~. cit., 459 
46. Shaler, ;88 
r 
Our enemies have a terrible advantage • 
in the fact that in our midst, in our 
camps, and along our avenues of travel 
they have active partisans, farmers and 
business men, who seemingly pursue their 
usual calling, but are, in fact, spies. 47 
~ To this gloomy picture of affairs in Kentucky, Shaler as-
serts in no measured terms that Kentuckyts quota of troops 
was always full, and though forty thousand men did go into 
• 
the rebellion, she raised all the men that fell to her lot 
almost without bounties, and practically without a draft, 
a record not exceeded, if equaled, by any state of the Un-
48 
ion. 
The followins statistics may prove convincing to many 
who have the impression that Kentucky furnished compara-
tively few troops to the Union army. The quota for Ken-
tucky showing the aggregate number of men furnished under 
all calls, compares favorably with other states. Loyalty 
in terms of regimental rosters could be more accurately 
measured, were the number of inhabitants of each state en-
rolled. The exact situation could have been seen, also, 
had the number of male inhabitants subject to draft been 
47. Official Records, sere I, vol. 4, 340 
48. Shaler, 269 
listed. The following table needs no explanation: • 
Maine •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71,745 
New HampShire •••••••••••••••••• 34,605 
Vermont •••••••••••••••••••••••• 35,24b 
Rhode Island ••••••••••••••••••• 23,711 
Connecticut •••••••••••••• , ••••• 57,270 
'07 New Jersey ••••••••••••••••••••• 79,511 
Delaware ••••••••••••••••••••••• 13,b51 
Maryland ••••••••••••••••••••••• 49,731 
West Virginia •••••••••••••••••• 32,003 
Michigan ••••••••••••••••••••••• 90,119 
Wisconsin ••••••••••••••••• ~ •••• 96,ll8 
Minnesota •••••••••••••••••••••• 25,034 
Iowa ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 75, 8£;0 
Kansas ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20,097 49 
Kentucky ••••••••••••••••••••••• 78,540 
Kentucky has the distinction of being the "only state in 
the Union that furnished more than her quota of troops with-
50 
out a draft." It is reported that at one time a draft 
was started, but when one of her members of congress, Gar-
rett Davis, was informed that the state had then furnished 
more than its quota, the draft was not made. In the ros-
ters of the various states is seen that Kentucky furnished 
more troops than many others in which a draft had to be 
called; among them were "Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Minne-
49. Annual Report Adjutant-General, 1865-1866 
Kentucky Documents, Washington Printing Office, (Wash-
ington, 1866), 15 
50. A. C. Quisenberry, "Kentuc~ Union Troops in the Civil 
War," Kentucky State Ristor cal Society, XVllr;-(Frank-
fort, 1920), January, December 
51 
sota, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire and New Jersey. ".' 
The number of slaves in Kentucky enlisting in the Union 
Army can be estimated only approximately, since they were 
enrolled as "United States Colored Troops," they were not 
accredited to Kentucky. There were"Yabout 25,000 according 
to several estimates of historians. 
The state raised and maintained at its own expense 
• 
20,000 State troops and militia, of whom Collins says "are 
admirably drilled in rifle tactics, handsomely uniformed, 
52 
and fully armed and equipped. 
When Kentucky abandoned neutrality in September, l86~ 
the Federal Government expected the state to smite the 
South as relentlessly as any radical abolitionist of Massa-
chussetts, but in this, as in political matters, Lincoln 
soon saw that Kentucky would have to be handled with care, 
caution and tact. Officers placed in command were Ken-
tuckians, even care was taken to make purchases in Ken-
tucky and to make payments immediately. Union sentiment 
could not be trifled with at this time. By December 1861, 
however, twenty thousand troops for special defense were 
51. Ibid., 137 
52. Collins, I, 86 
raised~ and by the end of the year~ 29~203 Kentuckiane had 
a proud record of active service before they were actually 
53 
mustered into service. 
A great shock dealt the Kentucky people at this most 
crucial time was the proclamation of General Fremont con-
fiscating the property of non-Federal sympathizers in Mis-
souri~ and liberating their slaves. The Kentucky Yeoman 
.. 
declared that 
If the monstrous outrages proposed in 
Fremont's proclamation be submitted to, 
then the people may make up their minds 
to submit to the utter destruction of 
every civil right. 54 
Lincoln saved the day by setting aside the objectionable 
features~ telling the obdurate Fremont, they would perhaps 
ruin the Union's fair prospects for Kentucky. He knew that 
"The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that procla-
55 
mation was modified." 
Under circumstances far more trying than any endured 
by any other state of the Union, Kentucky met the reqUisi-
tions for troops to carryon the war and according to Sha-
53. Speed, 143 
54. Kentucky Yeoman~ September 2~ 1861 
55. J. B. Nicolay, and J. A. Hay, Complete Works of Lincoln, 
Century Publishing Co. ,VI, (New York~ 1890), ;?7 
ler, "with a promptness and loyalty unsurpassed by any of 
56 
the states." 
Great numbers of Kentucky troops served within the 
state; from the very beginning they were employed in check-
ing the advance marches of the Confeaerates. The protec-
tion of the railroad connections was most important, since 
the long trains of freight cars were always heavily laden 
• 
with provisions, munitions of war and soldiers. "To defend 
and protect these lines," says Speed, who, himself was an 
officer, "no troops were so well adapted as those who were 
57 
familiar with the State."· General D. W. Lindsey was given 
the position of organizing troops to protect the various 
lines of communication because of his knowledge of the sit-
uation; of such importance did Sherman consider Kentucky's 
land trade-arteries. 
In defending their own State, the troops were defend-
ing the nation, for had Louisville been taken, or had the 
State cast her lot with ~e South, her soldiers pushing 
with the rebel armies to the Northern Border and then on 
to Ohio, Indiana and Illinois soil, the value of Kentucky's 
56. Shaler, 349 
57. Speed, 292 
r 
troops would have been estimated in very different fi~res. 
The physical status of the soldiery is very important, 
and the superiority of Kentucky's manhood is well-known; it 
can be attested in no more telling manner than by a table 
.... 
of measurements compiled from the report of the Sanitary 
Commission, made from measurements of the United States Vol-
unteers during the Civil War. The average height is almost 
.. 
an inch greater than the New England troops; the girth of 
chest and the circumference of head are larger; they equal 
in size the picked northern armies of Europe. Shaler says 
that were the thirty or forty thousand men who went into 
the Confederate Army included, it would have been probable 
that the averages given in the table would have been much 
greater. Even without this consideration the measurement 
of the fifty thousand troops is unusual and had this call 
to arms not been a levy en masse, the results no doubt would 
58 
have been more unusual. Kentucky gave brawn and brain of 
no mean proportions to the Union cause. Though the idea of 
"Kentucky giant" has been somewhat overdrawn by many Ken-
tucky did excel in physical proportions. 
58. Shaler, 374 
A Table of Measurements of American White .' 
Men compiled from Report of the Sanitary 
Commission, made from Measurements of the 
United states Volunteers during the Civil 
War. By ••• B. A. Gould 
Mean Height 
Nativity 
• 
o 
~ 
New England 152,370 
N.Y.,N.J.,Penn.273,026 
Ohio, Indiana 220,796 
Mich.,Mo.,III. 71,196 
Seabord Slave 
sta te s ••••••• 
Kentucky, Tenn. 50,334 
Free States West 
of Miss. R. 
British Maritime 
Provinces 
Canada 
England 
Scotland 
Ireland 
Germany 
Scandinavia 
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The measurements of troops from Tennessee and from Kentucky 
are listed together. But as those from Kentucky were far 
more humerous than those from Tennessee, for the reason 
that the Federal recruits from Tennessee were relatively 
few in number, we may safely regard these tables as repre-
senting the physical condition of the Kentucky troops. 
r ~ __ -----------------------------------------------------------------, 
Though Kentucky's coffers were filled with Southern 
gold, though she was richer in grain and live-stock so nec-
essary in war, than any other part of the South, though 
she was best fitted to maintain an army of any state in 
the Union, and though we admit tbat~hese were economic 
factors that made for ~portant service, yet the most ~­
portant of all was her sacrificial offering on the altar 
.. 
of her country, namely, the loss she sustained in the death 
and incapacitation of her soldiers. No more beautiful, or 
better, no truer tribute could be paid to Kentucky, than 
the official one in the form of a letter from one of her 
very many distinguished leaders. Since it is in the es-
timation of the writer, a summation of Kentucky's ~por­
tance, it is appended with gratification. 
Headquarters Kentucky Volunteers, .. 
Adjutant-Genera1's Office, 
Frankfort, Dec.l,1866. 
To His Excellency, Thomas E. Bramlette, Governor of 
Kentucky: 
It has been fashionable with some to reflect 
upon the loyalty of our State; but every true man 
must feel and cordially confess that Kentucky has, 
during the late war, under circumstances far more 
trying than those surrounding any other State in 
the Union, discharged her whole duty. She has at 
all times, and under all Circumstances, promptly 
responded tp the quotas assigned her, and not with 
the mercenary purchased by excessive State or lo-
cal bounty, but with citizens prompted by patriot-
r 
ism to the defense of their Government. In • 
proof of this, the gallant record of our State, 
I would refer those doubting, to the casualty 
statistics of this report, the record of bat-
tles in which Kentucky troops have borne an 
honorable part, and lastly to the seventy-
nine stand of colors, those silent yet elo-
quent souvenirs of toil and danger, now dis-
played in the Capitol of the sl;ate, to remain 
as evidence of the bravery of her sons, and as 
an incentive to continued patriotism and sacri-
fice whenever duty calls. Many of these flags 
have been pierced with shot and shell and their 
folds stained with the blood o~ their bearers, 
but all bearing evidence of the duty which Ken-
tucky troops were expected to do and did per-
form. Certainly, no one will rejoice more than 
your Excellency in the fact that there is not 
a blemish upon the escutcheon of a single organ-
ization from Kentucky. 
Very Respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 
D.W.Lindsey, 60 
Adjutant General of Kentucky. 
In the following table will be seen the numbers of 
Kentucky's sons, ~ her Union troops, who made the supreme ~ 
sacrifice. The numbers represent more men than quotas of 
troops furnished by anyone of the following states, Colo-
rado, Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, or Oregon. This count does 
not include the large numbers enrolled in the Confederacy. 
60. Annual Report Adjutant-General, 1861-1866, Kentucky 
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From the available sources examined it appears that 
in money, in men, in munitions of war, in food supplies and 
general supplies, Kentucky was by no means an economic de-
linquent. She contributed the lion's share to a war she so 
earnestly hoped and worked to avert. From a study of her 
annals one is safe in concluding that men of the highest 
type, money in no stinted measure, means of corporal exist-
ence in abundance, were the economic indices of her impor-
.. 
tance in the Civil War. 
61. W. R. Perrin, History of Kentucky, F. A. Battey and Co., 
(Chicago, 1887), 30 --
CHAPTER IV 
.' 
Political Factors Operating in Kentucky in 1860-1861 
Kentucky's political 1mportanc~ in the Civil War pe-
riod of her history evolved from the most difficult role 
she assumed and hoped to play to a successful conclusion. 
It was that of a peacemaker between her friends of the 
North and her friends of the South. Her reasons for think-
ing She might be able to effect a satisfactory solution for 
their sectional differences were various. The interests of 
Kentucky's composite life were bound to both the North and 
the South. As one of the northern tier of border states 
and the most centrally located of them, she tended to be a 
part of the North; as a typical border slave state with a 
segment cutting deep into the slaveholding South, she tended· 
to be a part of the South. 
A slave state bordering upon free states acting as a 
peacemaker, or an umpire between conflicting neighbors was 
not an anomalous role, at a time when the whole country was 
clamoring for peace. On the 17th of January, 1861, the 
Legislature of Kentucky assembled and on the 19th, Honor-
able R. T. Jacob of the Lower House brought the following 
resolution before the Assembly: 
r 
That the proper position of Kentucky is 
that of mediator between the sections, 
and that as an umpire she should remain 
firm and impartial in the day of trial 
to our beloved country, that her counsel 
and mediation may aid in restoring peace 
and harmony and brotherly love through-
out the land. 1 
Thus Kentucky's effort at peacemaking was an honest 
one made from an honest conviction ~at a crisis could be 
avoided by exercising sound judgment and peaceable measures. 
Her position as mediator was both logical and important. 
She was a slave state and not a planter state, hence not 
pro-Southern; she was not a free state and not an industri-
alist state, hence not pro-Northern; she was a typical bor-
der state untainted with the sectionalism raging north and 
south of her. Kentuckians felt convinced that through her 
able leaders, she could take an amicable position between 
the extremists of the North and the extremists of the South. 
The ultra-radicalism of the minority of both sections did 
not deter her. She was far enough north to understand the 
political leanings there. The North had not been aboli-
tionized. On the contrary, before the firing of Fort Sum-
1. Speed, 30 
the sentiment of the North was overwhelmingly conse~v­
She was far enough south to be cognizant of the 
ten ft and the "hiddenll planks in the party platforms. 
Kentucky philosophers were reasoning in about the same 
·""'7 ls as the sages across the Atlantic who were asking 
DU"iU ---
another why twenty-five million intelligent Americans 
not settle the conditions of one million uneducated 
:nu~~"'''''' .. 2 
lcans without tearing one another's throats." Hence 
se peaceable Americans l Kentuckians l whose reputation as 
ters was proverbial I in 1860 attempted to ameliorate 
"black precipitates" of the North and the "red precipi-
They thought the differences between 
sections could be compromised; in other great crises 
Kentuckian had brought about a com-
...... -.... .lU...Lse; trained in the school of the "Great Commoner I tf 
could bring forward his disciple, John J. Crittendenl 
whom Clay's mantle had fallen. For political sagacity 
rare foresight l few men surpassed Crittenden; his knowl-
of the tendency of public events and the immensity of 
struggle into which the nation was drifting was the re-
Scrugham, 11 
r 
suIt of years of study, observation and practical expari-
ence. 
When on the floor of the United States Senate, Decem-
ber 18, 1860, he explained the resolution he had formulated, 
in which he hoped would bring about~mity between the dis-
contented parties, he said he had 
•••• endeavored by these re!olutions 
to meet all these questions and causes 
of discontent by amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States, so that 
the settlement, if we can happily agree 
on any, may be permanent, and leave no 
cause for future controversy. 3 
The question of acceptance or rejection of the Crit-
tenden Compromise was the momentous one of the hour. It 
was of no importance respecting the actual existence of 
slavery where soil and climate prohibited any profit there-
from. Its significance seemed to be due to the fact that 
its acceptance would have put an end to the Republican Party. 
The radical and conservative groups of the party would have 
cut away had a settlement of the controversy of slavery in 
the territories been effected. T.he northern conservatives 
3. Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, Second Session, 
Part I, Dec. 18, 1860, 267 
and in fact the majority of the northern people were ~ fa-
vor of the acceptance of the Crittenden proposals, for they 
wished neither disunion nor war. The Crittenden Compromise 
was a test, an acid one for the Republican Party leaders on 
both the slavery questions and the stctional control of the 
national government. 
It has been declared by James Ford Rhodes that Lincoln 
• 
was responsible for the rejection of the Crittenden Compro-
mise. Other historians state the Republican leaders and 
politicians were more culpable, for the disunion of the Un-
ion or the states was not so serious a matter to them as 
the disunion of the Republican Party. One echo of such her-
alding was: "To compromise is to ruin the Republican Party, 
for it is to rend it asunder •••• Let the leaders stand 
firm •••• The vital question for the Republican Party is, 
'Will Abraham Lincoln stand firm in this trying hour?' We 
4 
answer, 'He willI'" To the politician or this stripe, 
the Crittenden Compromise and the secession of South Caro-
lina were schemes concocted for the destruction of the Re-
publican Party. Toombs' message to the people of Georgia 
4. New York Tribune, Feb.8, 1861; Scrugham 65 
states that "'!he test has been put fairly and frankly, and 
5 
it is decisive against the South." 
Ahl for the might have beenl "No doubt can now exist," 
says Rhodes, "and but little could have existed in January" 
.. ., 1861" that if it, Crittenden's Compromise plan, had been 
submitted to the people, it would have carried the Northern 
states by a great majority, that it would have obtained the 
• 
vote of almost every man in the border States" and that it 
would have received the preponderating voice of all the Cot-
6 
ton states but South Carolina. 11 
When Crittenden's plan was not submitted to the people" 
its rejection was an impetus to six other states to follow 
South Carolina. Kentucky was one of the eight remaining 
slave states which waited further developments. There was 
much muddled thinking by all parties, and many failed to 
distinguish the difference between "sectionalism" and "na-
tionalism" and party dOmination; thus public opinion led 
astray by the press of the period was as varied as individ-
ual minds. 
Kentucky would not be thwarted in her efforts for a 
5. Kentucky Yeoman" Dec. 27" 1860 
6. J. F. Rhodes" History of the United States from the 
Compromise of 1856" MacMillan Co., (New York, 1899), 
III, 261 
r 
general peace. George D. Prentice, considered the intel-
lectual match of any man of his day, used the columns of 
his paper, the Louisville Journal, pointed out to the peo-
ple of the state, that their duty was arduous and painful • 
... .., 
It was to keep Kentucky on the safe and lofty path of peace. 
"Peace is prosperity and liberty," he said, "as war is des-
olation and despotism." 7 
On January 17, 1861, Governor Magoffin in his message 
to the General Assembly declared his favor of the Critten-
den Compromise that had been rejected, and that the people 
of Kentucky should be given a chance to take further steps 
toward peace. He wrote to the Kentucky Yeoman: " ••• the 
mere election of Lincoln is not a sufficient cause for se-
8 
cession or rebellion." For Kentucky to take such a stand 
would be to inoculate her with a more insidious sectional-
ism than that which ravaged the extremists of the North and 
South. 
The general opinion of Kentuckians was that the war 
was an unnatural strife, and for them it would be interne-
cine and fratricidal. A fight between friends and brothers 
7. Louisville Journal, May 29, 1861 
8. Journal of the House of Representatives of Kentucky, 
AppendIx--:Co the Governor's Message, Yeoman aff'Ice, 
(Frankfort, Ky., 1861), 12. (Referred to hereafter as 
H ouse Journal.) 
r 
was looked upon with terror l and moreover l it meant a 4 dis-
ruption of the Union to which they had pledged to be loyal 
when they placed the block of Kentucky marble in the Wash-
ington monument bearing the inscriptionl "Under the aus-
pices of heaven and the precepts of Washington I Kentucky 
will be the last to give up the Union." 
A sense of pride in the Unionl a singular devotion to 
.. 
Itlwas the heritage bequeathed to Kentuckians by that great 
Nationalist of hers l - Clay. With such great mastery had 
this spirit of loyalty permeated their civic life l and es-
pecially in the great political parties of the State that 
the "Dove of Peace l " which his compromise was styledl hov-
ered still in the stormy days of 1861. "If we could accu-
rately determine l " says Shalerl "the origin of the singular 
deliberations that marked the Kentucky people during the 
Civil War l we should doubtless find that Clay'S influence 
9 
was of great moment in the determination of their attitude." 
We cannot be surprised then I when we read again and again 
such like pronouncements from his under-studYI Crittendenl 
aS I the dissolution of the Union can never be regarded as 
9. Shaler l 381 
r 
a remedy but as a consummation of the greatest evil tJ!:at 
can befall our country. 
The principles then that seemed to underlie all the 
activities of Kentucky during the months preceding and im-
. ., 
mediately following the firing o£ Fort Sumter were: 
1. War is unnatural strife - in Kentucky 
it would be internecine and fratricidal. 
2. The states have no moral·right to secede. 
3. The Federal Government has neither the 
Constitutional right or the power to co-
erce the seceded States back to the Union. 4. The Southern States should be permitted 
to go in peace - let them tryout their 
experiment. 
5. Kentucky, by well-timed mediation, could 
soon persuade the warring states to peace. 
6. Kentucky must stand by her political pledg-
es to the Union; they cannot be abandoned 
for sympathies. 
Coercion was just as offensive to legalistic minded 
Kentuckians as secession. It was their belief, an almost • 
unanimous belief that the central government had positively 
no right to coerce or use force of any kind to compel the 
return of the secessionists. In the Senate on January 18, 
1861, resolutions were presented which read: 
•••• we depreciate as unworthy of free-
men a Union to be held together by the 
sword; and Kentucky will never consent 
to the employment of force by the strong 
arm of the Federal Government to coerce 
r 
into submission the States of the South .' 
that have withdrawn from the Union, but 
enters against it her most solemn pro-
test. 10 
Union under the Constitution was the slogan of the 
Kentuckians at large. 
.. ...., 
Crittenden had expressed time and 
time again that disunion for Kentucky was the greatest of 
evils and a remedy for none. At the very first signs of 
• 
danger to the maintenance of the Union, all the border 
states and particularly Kentucky took a firm stand between 
the extremes of the North and the South. Not favoring se-
cession, She thought she could aid the North, not favoring 
coercion, she thought she could aid the South, thus her 
stand of ttMediatorial Neutralitytl as it was called. 
The old '¥higs of the border states, who had launched 
the Constitutional Union Party, were the If Union Savers" it 
was claimed, but not they alone, saved Kentucky for the Un-
ion. ItMediatorial Neutrality" which was the remote means 
of keeping Kentucky from secession, sprang, it is said, 
"fullgrown from the great body of Kentuckians; it was the 
11 
logical outgrowth of their characteristic conservatism," 
10. Journal of the Senate of Kentucky, Yeoman Office, 
(F'rarikfoN, L8'61 ), 49 
11. Connelly and Coulter, 855 
ra ther than from the muddled brains of scheming poll ticians. 
It came just as much from the "Mothers, Wives, Sisters, ~I' 
and Daughters of Kentucky," who bombarded the Legislature 
with petitions, to "guard them from the direful calamity 
of Civil War, by allowing Kentucky to.maintain inviolate 
12 ~ 
her neutrality." 
Perhaps the first significant allusion to a possible 
neutral position was made in an addre~s of Robert J.Breck-
inridge, before an immense assembly in Lexington on Janu-
ary 4,1861. He offered solutions to the difficulties con-
fronting the state. "The first of these is,n he sai~ "that 
in the progress of events, it may well become the border 
Slave states to unite themselves into a separate confeder-
acy; the second is, it may well become Kentucky, under var-
ious contingencies, to assume a separate sovereign posi-
tion, and act by herself." 
Neutrality was formally introduced in the Legislature 
of Kentucky on the 29th of January, 1861. After much pray-
ing, much debating, and strange to say, almost fighting, a 
decision which only Kentuckians would dare to make, a de-
12. Collins, 89 
cision which was denounced as cowardly by her enemiesl' but 
in 1860 and early 1861 seemed to be a very rational one 
was summed up in the ~ollowing Resolutions: 
The present duty o~ Kentucky is to main-
tain her present independent position, 
taking sides not with the administration, 
nor with the seceding states, but with 
the Union against them both; declaring 
her soil to be sacred ~rom the hostile 
tread of either; and if neclssary, to make 
the declaration good with her strong right 
arm. I; 
This neutrality was not an armed defiance o~ both bel-
ligerents, but a position o~ ~riendship to both. It as-
sumed the sovereignty o~ the individual state, a doctrine 
held by most Kentuckians of that day, whether Unionist or 
states Right men, but it spoke unmistakably ~or loyalty to 
14 
the Union, and a desire for its preservation. 
This strong nationalism should not be mistaken as a 
minimizing the insistence o~ the state on the rights and 
powers it claimed as its own. There should be no co~lict 
between the rights o~ the state and the rights o~ the Un-
ion; there were none, neither must there be any; if any 
I;. Rebellion Record, Vol. I, 74 
14. McElroy, 521 
should arise, they should be compromised away. The p~eser­
vation of the rights of the state was as important as the 
p~eservation of the rights of the Union. The never ending 
contention of Kentuckians was that the two were not incom-
... ..., 
patible; somewhat like the doctrine, it appears, that peace 
15 
must be had even if it must be fought for. 
Long and intimate connection with the Federal Govern-
• 
ment had given to Kentucky's peace champion, Crittenden, a 
deep insight into national conditions, generally. He also 
knew the minds of the men who had been recently called to 
lead the nation, hence was able to discount the wild tales 
of the times, as "This is the precedent which Honest Abe 
weaves into weary platitudes to demonstrate that the ex-
16 
ample of our fathers is in favor of modern Republicanism." 
Both the "rotten" and "hidden" plank of the Republican 
Platform were assailed by this partisan enthusiast, who 
added, "Abraham should not split the record and sit his 
lean person on the edge." 
No one doubted the sincerity and loyalty of Critten-
den when he said there was no truth in the current argu-
15. Connelley and Coulter, II, 854 
16. Louisville Journal, Letter of July I, 1861 
ment in Kentucky, that the North hated the South and ~at 
the South hated the North. "The Almighty," he said, has 
not made us with hearts o~ such malignity as to hate whole 
classes o~ our countrymen ~or the sins o~ a ~ew men. Even 
at the eleventh hour he believed thal the mediating policy 
might restore peace and he was strengthened in this convic-
tion by the report that President Lincoln in a conversa-
• 
tion with Garrett Davis, had declared that he would make 
no military movement against any state which did not o~~er 
armed resistance to the authorities o~ the United States, 
and also he had stated to Warner L. Underwood that, while 
he hoped that Kentucky would aid the Union in its present 
di~~iculties, he would make no e~~ort to compel her to do 
17 
so. 
When Virginia summoned a Peace Con~erence, Kentucky 
responded with renewed hopes, though the Compromise o~ 
Crittenden had.been a ~ailure. Un~ortunately the care~ully 
selected delegates rrom the northern states ~or this con-
rerence were or the ttnot-an-inch tt type or Republicans, and 
James B. Clay, son or Henry Clay reported that he round at 
17. Collins, 88 
.' this would be Peace Conference "Such miserable trickery, 
log-rolling, and clap-trap as would disgrace a county meet-
18 
ing to manufacture a platform for a constable to stand on." 
But another of Kentucky's hopes that wrongs could be re-
dressed by constitutional means was destined to be frus-
trated. 
The "overt act" of violence cam.. On April 12, 1861, 
the fatal Shots were fired, the Fabian policy of procrasti-
nation had driven the irate Southerners to desperation. 
What would Kentucky do now? Crittenden remarked that Henry 
Clay would have been worth his weight in gold if but once 
more he could have come forth from Ashland with his irre-
19 
sistible eloquence and eagle glance. 
Kentucky had shown great resourcefulness along almost 
every line of compromise, seizing any expedient to use in 
staying the course of secession. With the first rush of 
events she could not hope to continue with compromises in-
20 
definitely. Coercion which had been cried against so 
often in her legislative halls, had been perpetrated, and 
now grim war which she had so perseveringly tried to pre-
18. Kentucky Yeoman, March '20, 1861 
19. Louisville Journal, March 22, 1861 
20. Coulter, 34 
vent was now at the door. Hear the cry of' the trumpe\er: 
"Kentuckiansl You constitute today the f'orlorn hope of' Un-
ion. Will you stand f'irm and gloriously in the breaCh or 
21 
will you ignobly and insanely f'ly?" 
Another step must be taken by Kentucky. Mediatorial 
neutrality had f'ailed. The next position to assume was 
armed neutrality. This was a logic~ stand to take by Ken-
tuckians f'or they were opposed to both disunion and coer-
cion, - a temporary expedient or sort of' armed truce be-
tween those who wished to sustain the rights of' the South 
and an administration of' the national government which was 
sworn to uphold the Constitution of' the United States as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and those who f'elt that 
the general government must be sustained at all hazards 
22 
even though the administration were entirely obnoxious. 
The refusal of' the Governor of' Kentucky to send troops 
"f'or the wicked purpose of' subduing her sister Southern 
States" when the call came !'rom the War Department, re-
ceived the almost unanimous approval of' the people and 
their leaders. 
21. Louisville Journal, April 20, 1861 
22. Scrugham, 116 
r 
On May 10, 1861, at an informal caucus of the U~on 
and States Rights parties, a course of action for the state 
was agreed upon by the six "arbitrators" appointed official-
ly. Three questions were presented: First, the matter of 
·.7 
a convention, to determine the will of the people by a con-
vention. This was rejected. Second, that Kentucky take no 
part with either belligerent, but should maintain a posi-
• 
tion of armed neutrality, forbidding trespass within her 
borders by either. This question passed unanimously. Third, 
that an organization and equipment of an armed force for 
the protection of the state be provided. This was decided 
to be done and was entrusted to a board of five persons es-
23 
tablished by the Legislature. 
In arriving at the position of armed neutrality, there 
were many circuitous paths owing to the excitement caused 
by the excitable times and the excitable elements of the 
times. Innumerable conferences, much negotiating between 
the Union and Southern Rights parties, conventions, public 
and private meetings, - all betokened the seriousness of 
the situation. Through all ran the appeal for unanimity 
23- Collins, I, 90 
of action; internal conflicts would prove fatal to t~ Un-
ion cause. ItOf all the calamities which now impend" the 
most horrible would be dissension at home" It wrote a South-
24 
ern Rights editor. 
. .. ., 
Lincoln was watching Kentucky closely. Some thought 
because it was his native state and others because he con-
sidered it one of the pivotal states.in the conflict. His 
biographers record him saying that he hoped to have God on 
his side" but he must have Kentucky. ttl think,," he said" 
"to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole 
game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor as I 
25 
think, Maryland." Lincoln was a strategist. He handled 
the situation with such skill that it was easy for the polit-
ical leaders to commit the state to neutrality, for he be-
lieved it would lead ultimately to a full cooperation with 
the Union. On May 24, Kentucky was officially committed to 
a position which its people were in the process of assum-
ing from the secession of South Carolina. The Senate de-
clared that Kentucky was "willing to go before the civi-
lized world" and let her conduct pass into history and await 
24. Lexington Statesman" quoted in Kentucky Yeoman" 
April 18" 1861 
25. Nicolay and Hay" VI" 357, 361 
the candid and calm judgment of future and disinteres~ed 
26 
generations. 
Interesting light on the state of public opinion in 
Kentucky at this time, and particularly the prevailing at-
~ titude on the subject of neutrality, may be gained from the 
testimony taken in what were known as the "Kentucky Elec-
tion Cases," growing out of the Congressional Elections in 
• 
1866. One of the witnesses, John A. Prall of Lexington up-
on being asked if before the election of 1861, democrats 
and conservatives alike were not urging in public speeches, 
the neutrality of Kentucky, replied: Itl c~nnot say that 
both parties were urging it at the same time. I think not. 
My recollection of the political history of that period is, 
that the Union men first advocated neutrality." Just after 
the commencement of the war and the firing on Fort Sumter, 
there was a very great political agitation in the public 
mind of Kentucky. The Union men who were really for the 
Government seemed unwilling to meet the storm, and under 
the lead of Crittenden and others, there being then a can-
vas for election of delegates to the Border States Conven-
26. Congressional Globe, Part IV and Appendix, 37 cong. 
2 sess., 82; Collins,~tuckY:-l, 91 
r 
tion, the Union men took a position in favor of neutr«lity. 
It can hardly be said that the other party, who were desig-
nated as secessionists, took position directly against it, 
because they abandoned that canvas and withdrew their tick-
et. 
..... 
When the Union men began to favor the government, the 
secessionists favored neutrality. The two parties did not 
adopt it at the same time; one advocated it as the other 
27 • abandoned it.tt 
During the hectic days of early '61, the term "Neutra-
lltytt like those of "subjugationlt and "coercionu was mis-
leading. From all evidence it was apparent that there was 
no perfectly clear and consequently uniform conception ex-
iating throughout the state as to what was meant by neutra-
lity. ~~n of the same political creed entertained differ-
ent views on the subject, and opinions varied as to dia-
tricts and individual counties. The varying shades of opin-
ions, and the discussions, pro and con are not significant, 
but what Is very important Is, that it enabled the Union 
men to make the necessary steps in preparedness, namely, 
keeping the temper of the people unionistic, and distract-
27. Wilson, 214 
ing the measures and councils of those inclined to seces-
28 
sion. 
Many believed and still believe that neutrality saved 
the state to the Union, and only in this way would it have 
... " been saved; however, this is only a matter of opinion. We 
know the prime object of neutrality was to save the Union 
and this at a time before the war actually was declared • 
• 
Maintaining a position after it was adopted was the 
problem. The difficult phases of that problem were the 
President of the United States and Governor of the state 
itself. Kentucky's relations with the Federal Government 
were never close and cordial, but distrustful and suspi-
cious. Many times the state was made to feel that she was 
treated as a disloyal and not a part of the Union. The 
strongest Union paper in the state expressed the attitude 
of many disappointed Kentuckians, when it said: "Notwith-
standing that old Abe is 'none of our funeral' it makes 
one feel like disowning his country when its chief magis-
trate makes such a fourth-rate fool of himself." Lincoln 
was no hero in Kentucky; the vote for him was ~egligible. 
28. Louisville Morni~~ ~ourie:, April 20, 1861 
.-
There was no sympathy for the Republican Party b~ the 
Kentucky Unionists; their prime objective was to prevent a 
break-up of the Union. In their extremely difficult posi-
tion, Coulter says, "they resorted to arguments too theo-
. ~ 29 
retical and metaphysical to be convincing." The adminis-
tration and the government were considered as entirely sep-
arate and distinct from each other. One, the combined her-
• 
itage of past generations was permanent and unchanging, the 
other, a temporary expression or a mood, was transitory. 
Kentucky had thrived and prospered under the constitution, 
she could fight Lincoln or the Republicans whose tenure was 
only four years, but the government would remain. Archi-
bald Dixon, a prominent leader advanced the doctrine, that 
the contest is to be with Lincoln and not with the Union I 
It is Lincoln and his party who are the enemies of the coun-
try, the foes of the constitution. 
30 • 
The Union-loving Prentice, when hearing of Lincoln's 
call for troops, said, "We are struck with mingled amaze-
ment •••• The Administration is not of our choosing. We 
did not help to bring it into power. It is composed of our 
29. Frankfort Commonwealth, March I, 1861. 
30 • Coulter, 35 
;1 
deadly political foes. 1t Crittenden declared that Li~coln 
did not understand Kentucky's position, and that to send 
troops was to invite certain civil strife and war at home. 
The Southern Rights men were advocating immediate se-
~ 
cession, and of sending aid to the South; but these were in 
the minority. The great body of the Kentucky people, no 
matter how sorely, they were tried by. the Administration at 
WaShington, were more determined than ever, despite the fail-
ure of their compromise proposals, to cling to the Union. 
They were the first to join it and they would be the last to 
leave it. 
A prominent citizen and political leader, James Guthrie 
said that although Lincoln gave no evidence of a warlike dis-
position in his inaugural, yet he suspected it, for he said, 
;2 
"like a serpent, it spoke with a forked tongue." In this 
same speech, Guthrie, knowing that the majority of Americans 
in 1861 were peaceable, judging from the conservative vote 
of the preceding year, declared: "I want Kentucky to take 
her stand for peace, and appeal to that still small voice 
in the North crying for peace. There are religious men by 
;1. Louisville Journal, April 15, 1861 
;2. Rebellion Record, I, 7;, (doc) SpeeCh at Louisville, 
April 19, 1861 
habit, education and profession, whose hearts, when K~n­
tucky calls for peace, will be reached, and whose voices 
will reach the powers that be, and we will have peace." 
The Republicans claimed they belonged to the school 
;; 
.. ., 
of Henry Clay, the great nationalist, and Lincoln, himself, 
had once been a Henry Clay Whig, hence many strays were 
gathered into the fold because they thought the Republi-
• 
cans' program had been advocated by Henry Clay. All through 
the campaign of 1860, that party claimed Clay and held forth 
for disdain the anti-Clayism of Douglas. Such a swindle was 
as atrocious as the "great hog~ swindle" in the economic 
world, and was soon detected by the true whiggery element 
of the South and particularly by Kentuckians who could not 
entertain the thought for one moment that there was a Black 
Republican spot or blot on the shining record of their idol. 
Lincoln had often remarked that peace was his deliber-
ate choice, but it seems that Lincoln'S concept of peace was 
not the same as that of the minds untrained in the critical 
analysis of lawyers. Lincoln'S kind of peace was the one 
that would have resulted had the sectional control of the 
;;. Rebellion Record, I, 7; 
national government been unchallenged and had the choice 
of the electoral votes been satisfactory to the South as 
they had in the past. The peace of Lincoln and that of a 
common man were anything but synonomous. 
Such statements as the followirlg from an excellent ac-
count of the situation, show the difficulties under which 
loyal Union lovers labored. Dr. Mary Scrugham say, that 
• 
regardless of the permanent interests of Kentucky, her an-
tipathy for Lincoln's policy almost took her out of the Un-
ion. It was possible to prevent her immediate secession 
only by passing a declaration of armed neutrality as the 
34 
position of the state during the strife. 
Magoffin was pro-Southern in his sympathies, but not 
an original secessionist. Although he vetoed almost every 
measure of protection passed by the legislature, they were 
within his constitutional right. For eighteen months the 
legislature closely watched the chief executive, and they 
mistrusted him so thoroughly that he was not permitted to 
borrow money from the banks of the state, since they feared 
it would be spent in arming soldiers against the Union. 
Finally when the loan was made l the bank stipulated a~ a 
condition of the loan l that the money should not be used 
for aggressive purposes. 
In his official message it appeared that he thought 
·'7 the Southern Rights sentiment would predominate in the Leg-
islature. It had elected John C.Breckinridge to the Senate 
over Joshua F.Bell l by a vote of 81 ~o 52. He wished a 
Sovereignty Convention called, and if it had been l Shaler 
says that the State would have been compelled to accept the 
decision of men who were in sympathy and kinship with the 
South and under the influence of mob oratory, precipitate 
action would have followed. 35 
The fact that Magoffin did not accomplish what he had 
trusted could be effected in the Legislature of the winter 
and spring of 18611 is a telling evidence of the training 
in politics the Kentuckians of that period possessed. The 
utmost diversity of opinion in all forms of political ac-
tion was always present, and this very quality served to 
make a stampede into secession impossible. 
As time went on:, the affairs of Kentucky became more 
35. Shaler, 240 
.' and more complicated. The great mass of the people became 
more nervous and excited in their struggling between their 
loyalty to the Government and a deep-seated mistrust of the 
policy of the Administration in regard to war. Neutrality 
.. , 
was becoming more untenab1e l war-like preparations were no-
ticed all around l leaders were calling on all men "to pro-
cure for themselves the most effect~e arms l and then l them-
selves form an independent organization of companies l regi-
3h 
ments and divisions. 11 Such remarks as "If it requires 
all these men and all this moneYI to keep up an armed neu-
37 
tra1itYI God save the Commonwealth from an active war l 
were the opinions of many. 
From May lSh1 to September 1861 Kentucky was consid-
ered a neutral state but during these months she could by 
no means be considered peacefu1,or quiet. The final session. 
of the Legis1ature l May 10th to the 24thl was the theater 
of continuous conflict between the Unionist and Southern 
Rights men to get control of the armament of the State. An 
attempt was made to take the military power from the hands 
of the Governor whose leaning toward the Confederacy was 
36. Congressional Globe l 37 COng.1 2 sess. , appendix, 83 
37. Frankfort Commonwealth l May 11, 1861 
known. A military board was set up and though Magof1'!.n 
was a member, this legislation had taken away the consti-
tutional rights of the Governor as commander-in-chief of 
the State Guards whom Buckner had moulded for the Confed-
... 
eracy ostensibly, and the Home Guards who were Union in 
sentiment. Such a compromise was really the giant seed of 
internal conflict. All this was considered purely a de fen-
.. 
sive measure. In the mad rush to secure arms, the Home 
Guards were secretly aided by the Federal Government. Lin-
coln had forwarded a consignment of 5,000 arms to Union 
sympathizers. Southern sympathizers laid plans to seize 
them and it was only by the efforts of John C. Breckinridge 
;8 
and M. C. Johnson that a bloody outbreak was averted. A 
nominal price of one dollar each was the fine paid for a 
"Lincoln Gun" as these guns were called. Neutrality, it 
was claimed by the State Guards, was only a cloak to enable 
the Lincoln party to hide their real design to arm the ad-
herents of Lincoln and to disarm his opponents. 
Armed neutrality then, soon became a game between two 
;9 
factions, with the State as a stake. The State Guards, -
;8. Daniel Stevenson, "G6neral Nelson, Kentucky~_tb£L 
Lincoln Guns," Magazine of American History, X, 
(August, IB'B3,) 115 
;9. Coulter, 86 
the Secessionists' club, and the Home Guards, - the U~ion-
ists l club were often raised to strike because prejudices 
and fears were so skilfully played upon by demagogues and 
opportunists. 
~ Despite all, Kentucky's loyalty to the Union could not 
be gainsaid. True, the various acts of the Republicans did 
have the effect of so many thorns in the heart of a non-se~ 
• 
tional state, yet they would not leave the Union because of 
a dislike for Mr. L~ncoln's recent message to Congress, but 
they would take refuge in the creed that they were 
for the Constitution and Union, and not 
for Mr. Lincoln - and it is no part of 
their creed that a fooliSh opinion of a 
President, or a temporary mal-adminis-
tration of public affairs, is a suffi-
cient cause for breaking the nation to 
pieces. 40 
From within and without, daily assaults were being per-
petrated on Kentucky's neutrality. When the Confederate 
Congress passed a secrect act providing for the appropria-
tion of $1,000,000 to be spent under the direction of the 
President, "to aid the people of Kentucky in repelling any 
40. Frankfort Commonwealth, July 10, 1861 
invasion or occupation o£ their soil by the armed £opces 
41 
o£ the United states. Kentuckyts neutrality was doomed. 
Governor Morton o£ Indiana was watching the "Civil War in 
Kentucky" and urged the Federal Government not to lose a 
moment in preparing £or the crisis In Kentucky, and that 
he would be ready with £orces in Evansville to throw into 
Louisville. This was in August, and on September 2nd, he 
• 
is said to have remarked, "I£ we 10se'Kentucky now, God 
42 
help us." Then came the almost simultaneous invasion o£ 
the neutral soil o£ Kentucky by both belligerents. It is 
not the purpose here to conclude which army came £irst. 
Both had like lions been on the crouch £or weeks and as 
£ar as can be judged there were not many minutes interven-
ing between. the individual springs. 
Thus it was that the abandonment o£ neutrality was as 
has been shown, the great evil £orced on Kentucky. It had 
served its purpose best berore war was declared; a£ter-
wards, it became the tool o£ politicians and was doomed to 
an untimely death. The greatest £undamental urge £or de-
claring £or neutrality was the almost unanimous desire or 
41. O££icial Records, sere I, vol. 52, part 2, 604 
42. Ibid., sere I, vol. 4, 256 
the Kentucky people to act as peacemaker. When the neutral 
stand was taken, there was not a shadow of the entangling 
alliances and embarassing commitments that followed.' It 
was the unique and independent stand to take and proved as 
.•. , 
a chimerical and 1'oolhardy one only when the light 01' his-
tory was thrown on it. If the war had been a ninety-day 
conflict whiCh a large majority of the people thought at 
.. 
the time, then Kentucky's neutrality would have gone on rec-
ord as a success, but through the long-drawn out months and 
years it could not have been expected to survive. 
Kentucky's neutrality was regarded by the Federal Gov-
ernment as nationalistic in effect and from the first was 
cognizant 01' the fact that the political situation of the 
peace-loving Kentuckians dominated all other contingencies. 
It was one of those consecutive forces which made for Ken-
tucky's importance, in fact, one of the essential elements 
of her importance in the Civil War period. 
"Let the question be settled now, ••• which half a cen-
tury hence, might crush constitutional liberty ••• and be the 
43 destruction of public liberty ••• to the end of time." Such 
43. Louisville Daily Journal, June 21, 1861 
.' were the sentiments generally in Kentucky in the attempts 
for a settlement of the issue of secession. Such they were 
when the abandonment of neutrality was inevitable. 
The understanding of the true significance of Kentucky 
as a neutral state, or of Kentucky as peacemaker is best 
voiced by her historian and philosopher, Natilaniel S.Shale~ 
who says 
I do not know where else to find the like-
ness of these political movements of Ken-
tucky, so deliberate, so dignified and 
self-respecting as they were •••• When an 
historian arises who can treat this part 
of American history with the calm philos-
ophy which it deserves, we may be sure 
that the effort of Kentucky to stay the 
tide of Civil Conflict, and to decide the 
difficulty by statesmanship rather than 
by arms, will not be set down to her dis-
credit, but will appear as the most re-
markable, as well as the most creditable, 
spontaneous political action in the his-
tory of that great struggle. It is not 
too much to say that it will be regarded 
as one of the best evidences of a general 
political capacity that this country has 
yet afforded. 44 
44. Shaler, 256 
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